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The FCC and the First Amendment:
Observations on 40 Years of Radio
and Television Regulation
Glen 0. Robinson*
INTRODUCTION
Congress created the first system of regulation of radio and
television with its enactment of the Radio Act of 1927.1 Although
considered a drastic measure at that time,2 today, some forty
years after its creation, comprehensive regulation of radio and
television communications has for the most part become an accepted phenomenon. Although regulatory policy has yet to mature completely, the essential features of the policy have been outlined. With this coming of age, it seems appropriate to reflect on
an aspect of radio regulation which has been of critical importance from the earliest time: the first amendment implications
of the various facets of radio and television regulation.
Virtually everyone accepts the proposition that the first amendment does apply to radio and television. Whatever doubts might
once have existed about the applicability of the first amendment
to mass communications media were dispelled in United States
v. Paramount Pictures3 where the Supreme Court stated that it
had "no doubt" that radio, newspapers, and moving pictures
were covered by the first amendment. Even the Federal Communications Commission, which has never shown itself to be
keenly aware of the finer points of constitutional limitations,
has recognized the applicability of the first amendment as at
actions which
least some kind of general curb on its regulatory
4
are intended to limit or to aid free speech.
Despite this agreement on its general applicability, there
continues to be very considerable doubt on the part of many,
including the FCC, whether the first amendment really has the
same scope in the field of radio and television as it does in the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. 47 U.S.C. §§ 81-83 (1964).
2. See J. HERPING & G. GRoss, TELECOMnMumCATIONS, EcoNo1m:cs
AND REGULATION

226 (1936).

3. 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). See also American Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 374, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), affd, 347 U.S.
284 (1954).
4. E.g., Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En
Banc Programming Inquiry, 20 P & F RADio REG. 1902, 1907 (1960).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:67

case of other communications media. This doubt is founded on
the persistent and widely held, but almost never critically analyzed, assumption that broadcasting is somehow different or
unique.
For example, one of the assumed unique characteristics of
radio and television is the fact that for technical and economic
reasons access to these communications media is limited. Since
only a few thousand persons can use the airwaves, it follows
that some form of regulation is essential. Many assume that
this regulation must include some :orm of regulation of programming in order to compensate for the supposed monopoly
power given to the fortunate few who obtain licenses to use the
airwaves. When viewed in this light, there are relatively few
outside the industry who are very much concerned about FCC
regulation of program operations, even where it represents an
intrusion which would be bitterly attacked outside the field of
radio and television. So long as the broadcast licensee is regarded as a monopolist who, were it not for regulation, would
be able to run free, it is he who is portrayed as the censor and
not the Commission. Indeed, the Commission can pass itself off
as the champion of free speech, dedicated to ensuring that the
licensee gives the fullest expression to all possible viewpoints
and addresses itself to all possible tastes. There is no doubt that
the Commission is aided in playing this role by dissatisfaction
with the average quality of programming, particularly among
intellectuals who would be most like.y to express concern about
infringements on free speech. The Commission's repeated exhortations to broadcasters to upgrade the quality of programming and its efforts to encourage, cajole, or even coerce broadcasters to present better programming "in the public interest,"
add to the pattern. When the Commission is joined by the newspapers and the irrepressible complaints of the public, it is not
surprising that the broadcaster attracts little sympathy.
There is more than a little discrimination and a very noticeable absence of critical judgment in this treatment of broadcasting. Most of those who rail against the poor quality of television programming fare have never given a second thought to
the equally poor quality of the newspapers, magazines, and
books which flood the newsstands and bookstalls. Those who are
disturbed that there are only three television stations in their
city, or only three television networks, are not generally as
disturbed over the fact that there are only one, or perhaps two,
daily newspapers in the same city, and at most a handful of
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weekly news magazines. These same people are probably not
at all disturbed that there are only two major political parties.
But despite first appearances this Article is not intended as an
apology for the cause of broadcasters. It is, rather, an attempt
to discuss comprehensively the constitutional limits on governmental regulation of radio and television under the first amendment. It is important to emphasize at the outset that the primary concern of this Article is not with the entire scope of the
first amendment with regard to mass communications media of
all kinds. The principal aims here are to focus on those restraints on radio and television which are clearly extraordinary,
to point out those restraints which, though they may appear to
be of great moment, clearly are not extraordinary or are not,
in any event, unique to radio and television, and to evaluate the
first amendment implications of such restraints.
I. REGULATION OF ENTRY AND CONTROL OF
ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION
A. THE ALLOCATIONS AND LICENSING SCHEM
It is impossible to present a full history and description of
the complex system of allocations and licensing as it has been
developed for radio and television. However, a brief outline of
the scheme will suffice to set the framework for analyzing the
first amendment problems of Commission regulation.
The Radio Act of 1927 and its successor; the Communications
Act of 1934, both of which gave the Commission broad licensing
and regulatory powers over radio communications, were the outgrowth of a breakdown of the law during the early 1920's 5 which
had permitted the emerging commercial radio industry to develop
in chaos. Because of the lack of effective regulation prior to
1927, radio stations were free to begin operation when and where
5. The Radio Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 302, granted to the Secretary of Commerce authority to deal with regulatory problems pre-

sented by the private use of radio channels for broadcasting including authority to license radio broadcast stations. However, the
Secretary's authority to regulate under the Act was virtually destroyed
by subsequent judicial interpretation.
Co., 286 F. 1003

(D.C. Cir. 1923),

In Hoover v. Intercity Radio

appeal dismissed per stipulation,

266 U.S. 636 (1924), the court held that the Secretary lacked discretion
to refuse to renew a license on the grounds of interference. Subsequently in United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill.
1926), a district court held that licensees were not bound by nonstatutory regulations and could operate on any frequency despite the
Secretary's regulations to the contrary. Following Zenith the Secretary
abandoned all efforts to regulate and urged, in vain, self-regulation.
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they chose. The new stations used any frequency they desired,
changed frequencies, and increased power without regard to interference caused to others. The result was a great waste of radio
frequencies because "with everybody on the air, nobody could
be heard." The primary purposes of the 1927 Act were to ensure adequate technical service to the public by establishing regulations designed to eliminate objectionable interference and to
promote optimum utilization of the radio spectrum through fair,
7
efficient, and equitable distribution of facilities.
To accomplish these objectives, the Commission has allocated
different portions of the radio spectrum to different kinds of
uses, such as radio and television broadcast, citizens radio, and
safety and special services. Secondly, it has allocated the available broadcasting channels on a geographic basis in an attempt to
achieve optimum utilization with mnTimal electrical interference
and a fair and equitable distribution of the frequencies."
The most flexible system of allocation is the allocation and
distribution of AM frequencies and stations. Standard broadcast (AM) stations are broken down into four major classes.0
Each class of stations is given its own normally protected contour within which its signal is intended to be free of objectionable
interference from co-channel and adjacent channel stations. 10
Although some effort has been made to develop a reasonably
equitable distribution of the AM facilities to all parts of the
6. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943). For a more
extensive history of this early period, the failure of regulation under
the Radio Act of 1912, and enactment of the Acts of 1927 and 1934, see
L. WHITE, THE AIERICAN RADIO 126-54:

(1947);

OFFICE OF NETWORK

STuDY, FCC, SECOND INTERIM REPORT ON TELEviSION NETWORK PRocuREMENT pt. II, 59-69 (1965).

7. See NBC v. United States, 319 'U.S.190 (1943); W. JONES, REPORT TO THE ADMINSTRATTVE CONFERENCE, LICENSING OF MAJOR BROADCAST
FACILITIES BY THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 3-6 (1962).

8. For a useful summary of these two types of allocation of the
radio spectrum and of the principal components of the -economic structure of the broadcasting industry; see VT. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON REGULATED INDUSTRIES 1032-63 (1967).,

9. 47 C.F.R. § 73.21 (1967).
10. The normally protected contour concept is far too technical
and complex for discussion here. It is :fficient to note that the concept of normally protected contour involves a relationship between
(a) a signal by the protected station of specified strength (for most
AM stations, the 0.5 millivolt/meter ground wave signal is protected
during the day) and (b) the interfering signal of another station which

exceeds a specified strength (which varies depending on whether the

signal is co-channel or adjacent channel) such that the desired station's
service in those areas which it is designed to serve is free of objectionable interference from the undesired station.
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country, no fixed assignment scheme, such as has been adopted
for FM or television, has ever been established for AM radio.
The FM allocation system was originally the same as that
for AM stations. Recently, however, the Commission abandoned the flexible AM approach and, in lieu of the normally
protected contour approach, established a system of allocation
based on minimum mileage separation between facilities and on
specific assignments of FM frequencies to specific communities.'
The current FM allocation system is patterned on the allocation scheme for television. At the time when the Commission
came to consider allocation of frequencies for television use, it
had the benefit of some twenty years experience with its AM
broadcast allocations scheme, a system which, due to excessive
flexibility, had permitted the spectrum to become overcrowded
and, as a result, had failed in its primary purpose of preventing
objectionable interference. To guard against overcrowding and
the resultant erosion of service because of objectionable interference, the Commission in its Sixth Report and Order in 196212

set forth a comprehensive scheme for allocating all television
channels on a fixed basis across the country. 13 The heart of the
allocations scheme is a table of assignments which assigns all
television channels to specific communities. The table is based
on a system of minimum mileage separations between stations,
designed to eliminate in advance the possibility of objectionable
interference in the service areas of existing and potential television stations.
Although the table of assignments is fixed, it is not rigid.
Changes in allocations have been made on a selective basis. Although the Commission has generally adhered to the minimum
mileage separation requirements and refused to authorize shortspaced assignments, 4 since 1952 it has granted numerous peti11. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.202-03 (1967). See Revision of FM Broadcast
Rules, 23 P & F RADIO REG. 1859 (1963).
12. Sixth Report on Television Allocations, 1 P & F RADIo Pic.
pt. 3, at 91:601 (1952).

13. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.606-07 (1967).

14. The Commission in Interim Policy on VHF-TV Channel Assignments, 21 P & F RADIo REG. 1695 (1961), undertook consideration of
short-spaced VHF assignments in certain specified markets in which
only two VHF stations then operated, but refused to adopt a policy
under which it would authorize further short-spaced VHF assignments
in markets having "serious shortages" of channels. Subsequently, in
VHF Drop-ins, 25 P & F RADIo REG. 1687 (1963), the Commission rejected most of the limited drop-in proposals which had been held for
consideration under its prior Report and Order in 21 P & F RADIo REG.
1695 (1961).
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tions to amend the table and has reassigned channels to different
locations. 15
Within this general allocations framework, the Commission
controls entry into broadcasting by a system of licenses renewable every three years. 16 Leaving aside those cases involving
comparative choice between two or more mutually exclusive applications, licenses for available frequencies are granted subject
to a showing by the applicant that it has complied with the Commission's technical regulations and standards, that it possesses
the necessary character,1 7 financial,' s and legal' 9 qualifications,
and that its program operations will serve the public interest. 20

15. E.g., VHF Channel Assignments in Nevada, 7 P & F RADIo
REG. 2d 1589 (1966); Channel Assignment in Rhinelander, Wisc., 3

P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1683 (1964). The FM table of assignments possesses the same flexibility and reassignments can be made on petition
of interested party or on the Commission's motion. E.g., FM Channel
Assignments, 1 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1545 (1963).
16. 48 Stat. 1081 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1964). Although in the
field of radio and television theCommission's authority to regulate entry was originally considered to be limited to radio and television
broadcast stations, the Commission has now extended its authority to
limit and control entry into the nonbroadcast radio and television area
of community antenna television, discussed below. However, the Commission's "regulation" of entry into the field of community antenna television is limited and is incidental to its licensing of radio and television broadcast stations.
17. This is a negative qualification and the applicant need not
affirmatively allege good character. Typically a finding of "bad" character relates to willful refusal to disclose or misrepresentations to the
Commission. See, e.g., WMOZ, Inc., 1 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 801 (1964).
But it may involve virtually any activity which bears on character,
e.g., violation of the Communications Act, FCC regulations, or other
laws. See, e.g., General Electric Co:, 2 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1038 (1964)
(violation of antitrust laws considered). See generally Brown, Char-

acter and Candor Requirements for FCC Licensees, 22 LAw & CoN-

644 (1957).
18. Traditionally, applicants were required to show financial
resources sufficient to build the station 'and operate it for three months
without advertising revenue. Recently, however, the Commission has
established a requirement that all stations demonstrate financial ability
to construct and meet fixed, and operating costs for one year without
revenue or to establish convincingly that such revenue will be forthcoming in an amount sufficient to continue operation. Ultravision
Broadcasting Co., 5 P & F RADio REG. 2d 34 3 (1965).
19. Legal qualifications relate chiefly to § 310 (a) of the Act, forbidding licenses to aliens, e.g., United Artists Broadcasting, Inc., 7 P & F
RADIO REG. 2d 7 (1966), and to compliance with the Commission's multiple ownership rules. See the discussion of multiple ownership rules
in text accompanying notes 26-27 infra.
20. For a discussion of program regulation, see Part II infra.
TEMP. PROB.
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B. GENEAL OUTLINE OF EcoNomc REGULATION
Unlike most other federal regulatory schemes, the Communications Act does not contemplate a system of economic
regulation and, accordingly, does not authorize the Commission
either to fix the rates charged by the licensed stations or to engage in other general economic regulation.2 1 Notwithstanding
this supposed limitation on its authority, the Commission has,
in fact, exercised its regulatory powers to control certain economic aspects of radio and television to a considerable degree.
1. Monopoly, Diversification,and ChainBroadcasting
Although the Commission does not have power to enforce
the antitrust laws as such,22 - it has long undertaken economic
regulation along essentially antitrust lines, relying on its general
authority to protect the public interest. The Commission's multiple ownership rules, its regulation of certain network practices,
and its policy of favoring diversification of control in the mass
communications media all reflect economic policy substantially
similar to the policies of the federal antitrust laws.
The genesis of the Commission's regulation of economic concentration is its Report on Chain Broadcasting,23 released in
1941 after some three years of intensive study of problems posed
principally by the networks. The present scope of the rules
and policies which grew out of this original study 24 can be
summarized very generally. The rules prohibit or limit various
types of exclusive dealing practices between networks and affiliated stations and network ownership of stations under circumstances where it would restrain competition.2 5 In addition, mul21. E.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
For a brief discussion of the similarities and differences as to the
economic characteristics of broadcasting and public utility fields where
there is extensive economic regulation, see Levin, Federal Control of
Entry in the Broadcast Industry, 5 J. LAw & EcoN. 49, 52-56 (1962).
22. United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 343 (1959).
23. FCC, REPORT ON CHAiN BROADCASTING (1941).

24. The fullest treatment of the problem of economic concentration
in radio and television, although now considerably out of date, is the
so-called Barrow Report, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, REPORT ON NETWORK BROADCASTiNG, H.R. REP. No. 1297, 85th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1958) [hereinafter cited NETWORK BROADCASTING]. See
also Hale & Hale, Competition or Control 1I: Radio and Television
Broadcasting, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 585 (1959).

25. These rules, generally referred to as the "chain broadcasting

rules," are substantially identical for radio and television. See 47 C.F.R.

§§ 73.131-.138 (AM), .231-.238 (FM), .658 (TV) (1967).

For a comprehensive history of the rules up to 1958, see NETWORK
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tiple ownership rules limit the total number of stations which
can be held under common ownership or under common control 26
and prohibit "duopoly," the common ownership or control of
27
two or more stations of the same class ha the same area.

The Commission's original chain broadcasting regulations
were upheld in National Broadcasting Company v. United
States,28 against a challenge that they were beyond the Commission's statutory powers. The Commission's multiple ownership
rules were subsequently upheld against a rather feeble attack
The principal changes in the rules since 1958 have been
the prohibition of television option time, see Television Option Time,
25 P & F RADIO REG. 1651 (1963), and the prohibition of network's
representation of affiliated stations in selling national spot sales, see
Network Spot Sales Representation, 19 P & F RADIO REG. 1501 (1960),
affd sub nom. Metropolitan Television Co. v. FCC, 289 F.2d 874 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
26. Again the rules are substantially identical for radio and television. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35 (AM), .240 (FM), .636 (TV) (1967).
With respect to AM and FM stations, the rules place an upper limit on
common ownership, interest in, or control of seven stations. With respect to television stations, the upper limit is again seven stations, no
more than five of which may be VHF stations. For a brief outline of
the history of these rules, see NETWORK BROADCASTING 84.
In 1965 the Commission proposed a further amendment to the
multiple ownership rule to limit common ownership of television stations in the "top 50" markets to a total of one UHF and two VHF staBROADCASTING.

tions.

Television Multiple Ownership Rules, 5 P & F RADIo REG. 2d

1609 (1965). Pending such amendment, it adopted an "interim policy"
under which it would, in the absence of a compelling showing, designate for hearing any application to acquire a VHF station in the top 50
television markets by a party already having one or more such stations or by a new party to acquire more than one such station. Although this interim policy was undoubtedly intended to have some
restraining effect in itself, this effect was zlmost certainly weakened by
the Commission's subsequent refusal to order a hearing on an application by a Chicago station licensee to take over and operate a station in
Denver, one of the top 50 markets. Channel 2 Corp., 6 P & F RADIO
REa.2d 885 (1966).
27. The "duopoly" rules formerly prohibited common ownership,
interest in or control of another station in the same class where both
would serve "substantially the same area." Under this approach a number of different factors were considered in determining whether two
stations would serve substantially the same area. See, e.g., Sheffield
Broadcasting Co., 21 P & F RADIo REG. 514j (1962). The current rules,
however, have established fixed boundaries to this "area" by proscribing common ownership, interest in, or control of two or more stations where there would result any overlap of specified contours of the
respective stations. In AM and FM, any overlap of the respective 1
mv/m contours is proscribed; in television, overlap of Grade B contours
is proscribed. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35 (AM), .240 (FM), .636 (TV) (1967).
28. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The NBC case also considered and rejected a first amendment challenge to the regulations, discussed at
note 73 infra.

1967]

THE FCC AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

75

29

in United States v. Storer BroadcastingCompany.
Apart from the chain broadcasting and multiple ownership
rules, the Commission has long purported to follow a general
licensing policy of promoting diversification of ownership of all
mass communications media 3o in evaluating the respective merits
of competing applicants in a comparative hearing. 31 This policy
has never been crystallized into written regulations, and, like
most of the factors assessed in comparative hearings, it has not
32
been vigorously or consistently applied.
2. Economic Injury Through Competition
Ignoring dicta in several early circuit court opinions, 33 the
the Commission persistently refused, until recent years, to
consider competitive economic injury to existing licensees as
a basis for refusing to license new stations. This policy was approved in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,34 where the
Supreme Court held that the Commission was not bound to consider economic injury as such in determining whether or not to
grant an application for a new station. However, the Court did
29. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
30. The other media interests generally involved besides radio and
television are newspaper interests. However, while ownership, interest in, or control of a newspaper is a comparative "demerit" against an
applicant in theory, the fact remains that common ownership of newspapers and broadcast stations is so prevalent as to indicate that newspaper ownership is not a serious liability. See, e.g., the comprehensive list of broadcast stations identified with newspaper and magazine ownership in 1966 BROADCASTnIG YEARBOOK, at A-92-99.
31. In noncomparative cases the Commission has only rarely considered an applicant's ownership or control of other communications
media where the applicant meets the multiple ownership rules. See
NETwoRx BROADCASTInG 112-13. A rare exception is Laurence W. Harry,
13 F.C.C. 23 (1948), aff'd sub nom. Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180
F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
32. As to newspapers, see note 30 supra, and Heckman, Diversifi-

cation of Control of the Media of Mass Communication-Policy or
Fallacy?, 42 GEo. L.J. 378 (1954) (which argues, however, that the
diversification policy should not be pursued except to prevent monopoly). For a general criticism of the policy as applied both with respect
to newspaper and other radio ownership, see NETWORK BROADCASTING

121-24; Note, Diversification and the Public Interest: Administrative
Responsibility of the FCC, 66 YALE L.J. 365 (1957).
The Commission's new Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 5 P & F RADio REG. 2d 1901 (1965) suggests a somewhat

greater stress on the factor of diversification than has been stressed in
the past cases. To what extent this stress in a general policy statement
will carry over to actual decision, however, is anyone's guess.
33.

E.g., WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 109 F.2d 665, 666-68 (D.C. Cir. 1939);

Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 107 F.2d 956, 957-58 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
34. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
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indicate that under some circumstances economic injury could
be taken into account where it might have an important bearing
on the ability of the new station or the existing station to render
adequate service. 35 Following Sanders, the Commission continued to disclaim any power to refuse licenses on the grounds
of competitive injury, or that, if it had such power, it would be
36
in the public interest to exercise it.
In 1958, the policy of refusing to consider competitive injury
even where the competitive injury might lead to disruption of
service was sharply reversed in Carroll Broadcasting Company
v. FCC.37 The court held that the Commission had misread the
Sanders case and that, while the Commission could not consider
competitive, economic injury merely for the purpose of protecting
the revenue of an existing station, it could and must take it into
account where it threatens the ability of the existing station to
provide adequate service to the public. Although the primary
concern of the court in Carroll seems to have been with competitive injury which would so drastically curtail an existing
station's revenues as to cause it to leave the air, it seems clear
that the decision was not intended l;o be limited to such extreme situations. Thus, for example, economic injury which
might lead to curtailment of high-cost, local live programming
would justify refusal to license a new station.
The Commission's refusal to consider competitive injury in
the licensing of new stations prior to the Carroll case was motivated principally by a fear of being deluged by similar protests
against every new applicant. The Commission was unwilling to
undertake the difficult task of sorting out the valid protests.
The Commission explained its refusal to consider economic injury by disclaiming the power to make any such economic determinations, but this seems to have been more of a rationalization
than a reason, since the Commission has long rendered economic
judgments in converse situations involving economic concentration. The most notable example of the Commission's willingness
to consider economic injury on a broad, general plane in which
it could choose the time and place to apply economic judgment
and policy is its deintermixture proceedings during the 1950's,
35.

Id. at 476.

36. See Voice of Cullman, 14 F.C.C. 770 (1950); Southeastern En-

terprises, 13 P & F RADIO REG. 139 (1957). For a vigorous criticism of
the latter case and the Commission's policy of refusing to consider
competitive injury, see Note, Economic Injury in FCC Licensing: The
Public Interest Ignored, 67 YALE L.J. 135 (1957).
37. 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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in which it decided to reallocate VHF and UHF channels to different television markets because of the inability of UHF stations to compete effectively with VHF stations in the same
market.38 Although the Commission has now declared a moratorium on its deintermixture policy because of the enactment of
38. VHF and UHF channels were intermixed in the same markets
in Sixth Report on Television Allocation, 1 P & F RADIO REG. pt. 3, at
91:601 (1952). It was not long after the lifting of the television "freeze"
that it became apparent that UHF stations suffered a very substantial
competitive disadvantage in comparison to VHF, due mainly to (a)
inferior propagation characteristics of UHF and a very restricted service
area in the case of IHF stations as compared with VHF stations and
(b) the manufacture of VHF-only receivers by television set manu-

facturers.

To correct the situation, the Commission instituted five rulemaking
cases looking towards the deintermixture of five specific communities.
On further study of the problem, the Commission determined that the
problem was too widespread to be materially affected by deintermixture
in only five markets and terminated the earlier proposals, First Report
Subsequently,
on Deintermixture, 13 P & F RADIo REG. 1511 (1955).
the Commission instituted rulemaking looking toward solution of the
problem on a broad, nationwide basis, as a result of which it concluded that the most promising solution to the problem would be to
transfer all television stations to UHF frequencies, Second Report on
Deintermixture, 13 P & F RADIo REG. 1571, 1577 (1956). As an "interim"
measure, it instituted proceedings looking toward deintermixture in
certain specified communities. Id. at 1581, 1583-84. Following the release of its Second Report, the Commission deintermixed a number of
communities, e.g., Elmira Deintermixture Case, 15 P & F RADIO REG.
1515 (1957); Fresno Deintermixture Case, 15 P & F RADio REG. 1586i
(1957), modified, 18 P & F RADIo REG. 1733 (1959), modified further,
19 P & F RADIO REG. 1598a (1960).

The Commission's proposal to transfer all television stations to UHF
announced in 1956 failed to jell. In April, 1959, the Commission reported to Congress, in substance, that it was still "studying" the problem. It reported its conclusion that deintermixture either on a selective
community or area basis was ineffective but that, as an "interim policy,"
it had decided to add VHF channels to some large population centers.
The VHF additions were short-spaced drop-ins which were supposed to
alleviate the shortage of service in those areas by adding a third VHF
station-obviously on the assumption that UHF in those areas could not
be made to work. See Hearings on Television Allocations Before the
Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4585-611 (1960) (Statement of FCC Chairman Doerfer).
The 1959 report to Congress notwithstanding, the Commission
subsequently proposed deintermixture on a selective basis in eight
specified communities, Expanded Use of UHF Channels, 21 P & F RADIo
REG. 1711, 1714 (1961). However, the deintermixture proposals were
met by fierce opposition from the strongest elements in the industry.
At the same time that it released its interim policy in 1961, the Commission proposed to Congress that it enact all-channel receiver legislation which would require all receivers shipped in interstate commerce
to be capable of receiving both VHF and UHF channels. At that time
it seems evident that the Commission viewed all-channel receiver legislation as a means for paving the way to an eventual shift of all VHF
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the all-channel receiver legislation, 9 this does not represent an
abandonment of the type of economic regulation represented by
its deintermixture efforts, but simply the choice of a different
remedy: legislation requiring television receivers to be compatible with both UBF and VHF reception.
3.

Regulationof Community Antenna; Television

Without question the most extensive economic regulation
yet undertaken by the Commission is its controversial regulation
of community antenna television (CATV).40 Because of its relastations to the UHF spectrum. See id. at 1714-15. The all-channel
receiver legislation proved to be a promising way out of the deintermixture controversy for both the Commission and the industry. The
industry opponents of deintermixture agreed to support the all-channel
receiver legislation but insisted that Congress exact from the Commission a commitment that its interim policy on deintermixture and its
intention to pursue an all-UHF system would be abandoned for at
least a sufficient period of time to permit the all-channel receiver
legislation to cure the competitive imbalance between UHF and VHF,
which it was thought that the all-channel receiver legislation could do.
On the representation by the Commission that it would terminate its
deintermixture efforts, the all-channel receiver legislation was enacted
,in 1962 as § 303(s) of the Communications Act. See H.R. REP. No.
1559, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-26 (1962); S. REP. No. 1526, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 13-19 (1962). As a result, the Commission declared a moratorium on its deintermixture proposals. EDeintermixture Cases, 23 P & F
RADIO REG. 1645 (1962).
39. See note 38 supra.
40. Reduced to its basic elements, a CATV system consists of two
basic components: (a) a "head-end" system consisting of receiving
antennae and related equipment (e.g., amplifiers), usually of high gain
capability and generally situated in a location best suited for receiving
usable signals from broadcast stations; and (b) a distribution system
consisting of coaxial cable, which transmits the signal from the head-end
system to the subscriber, and amplifiers to compensate for signal attenuation through the cable. Although the CATV system itself transmits entirely by wire, most larger systems today make use of microwave relay facilities which permit a signal to be picked up by a receiving antenna near its point of origin, converted to microwave frequencies and transmitted virtually any distance to another receiving
antenna from which it is converted back to video-audio frequencies
and transmitted by cable to the subscriber. For a brief description,
see Hearings on Regulation of Community Antenna Television Before
the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 89-16, 4-5
(1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings on CATV Regulation].
For general surveys of the CATV regulation problem, see Note,
The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, 79 HARv. L. REv. 366 (1965);
Note, Community Antenna Television: Survey of a Regulatory Problem, 52 GRo. L.J. 136 (1963). An economic analysis of the CATV
industry, commissioned by the FCC, is M. SEMEN, AN EcoNolmc ANALYsis OF COMmuNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION SYsTEsVS AND THE TELEVISION
BROADCAST

INDUSTRY (1965)

[hereinafter cited as SEIMEN

REPORT].

Al-
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rive newness and far-reaching importance, and because it serves
as an ideal vehicle for considering what limitations, if any, the
first amendment places on economic regulation by the Commission the Commission's regulatory efforts to control CATV warrant somewhat greater attention than other areas of FCC economic regulation.
Begun as relatively crude facilities designed to bring television broadcast signals into topographic pockets and other geographical areas where an adequate number of satisfactory signals
could not be received, CATV has now become a major rival of
the broadcast industry. 41 In the six year period between 1959,
when the Commission first considered CATV regulation, 42 and
1965, when it first adopted comprehensive regulations governing CATV operations, 43 the number of CATV systems more than
trebled. 44 Instead of the old "Mom and Pop" type of community
facility, bringing in perhaps three to five nearby signals, CATV
systems now boast of twenty or more channels and, with the aid
of microwave, can take the signals virtually any distance and
into any size or type of community. 45 With this extraordinary
development and growth it was inevitable that there would be
a confrontation between CATV owners and broadcasters, for
although CATV does not generally compete with broadcast stafor the auditions for advertising revenues, 46 it does compete
47
ence on which their advertising revenue depends.
though the SEmEN REPORT contains a number of dubious conclusions,
resulting partly from now out-of-date statistics, it provides a useful
general description of the industry and its structure as of that time.
41. On the growth of CATV, see authorities cited note 40 supra.
42. CATV Systems and Auxiliary Television Services, 18 P & F
RADIO REG. 1573 (1959).
43. FirstReport on CATV Regulation, 4 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1725
(1965) [hereinafter cited as First Report].
44. Second Report on CATV Regulation, 6 P & F RADIo REG. 2d
1717, 1772-79 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Second Report].
45. Id.
46. Some CATV systems have carried local advertising but not to
the degree that it has become a serious competitor for advertising
revenues. The Commission's new rules prohibit deletion of advertising
of the station whose signal is carried. Id. at 1757. However, they apparently do not prohibit carriage of advertising by CATV in addition
to the station's advertising.
47. The existence or probable existence vel non of economic injury
is really at the heart of the entire controversy between CATV, broadcasters, and the Commission. CATV interests have persistently denied
that there has been (or that there is sufficient evidence that there
will be) any serious impairment to broadcast revenues resulting from
CATV competition. See, e.g., 1965 Hearings on CATV Regulation 132-33,
213-15 (statements of President of NCTA and President of Jerrold
Corp.). The broadcast opponents of CATV on the other hand have
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The history of CATV regulation began with the Commission's termination of an inquiry into the economic impact of
CATV systems and other auxiliary facilities such as translators
on broadcast stations. 48 The Commission in 1959 found insufficient economic impact by CATV systems at that stage of their
development to justify taking jurisdiction over these all-wire
facilities. 49 However, it was not long before it became apparent
contended essentially that the past impact has been understated but,
in any event, the past experience with CATV, based on its operations
as a small service, is an inadequate guide to the future and that current
trends show demonstrable tendencies towards economic impact. See,
e.g., id. at 357-59, 389-94; Appendix to Reply Comments of NAB, in
FCC Dkt. Nos. 14895 and 15233, Oct. 26, 1964 (the "Fisher Report").
The Commission, wavering somewhat at first, has now sided with the
latter view that CATV would, absent regulation, have strong economic
impact on all broadcast stations. Second Report 1772-80.
48. CATV Systems and Auxiliary Television Services, 18 P & F
RADIO REG. 1573 (1959).

Translators are low power, auxiliary broadcast

stations designed, as CATV systems were originally designed, to fill in
topographic "pockets" and sparsely settled areas where adequate offthe-air service cannot be received from regular broadcast stations.
For a brief description of their history and use, see SEMEN REPORT 18-22.
Historically, translator operations have been severely restricted by
Commission regulation, primarily to avoid a very troublesome problem of interference which it has been thought would result from too
free licensing of such facilities. However, the Commission has in recent
years taken some steps to liberalize translator licensing and has under
consideration other proposals. See Second Report 1757-61. Without
question, considerable impetus for this liberalization policy stems from
the desire to provide an auxiliary broadcast facility as a competitive
substitute for CATV.
49. CATV Systems and Auxiliary Television Services, 18 P & F
RADIO REG. 1573, 1595-97, 1602 (1959). Although the Commission did not
pass directly on its statutory power to control CATV in the event it
were shown that CATV had a marked economic impact on broadcasting,
it did reject other bases of jurisdiction. It held that it had no power to
assert jurisdiction over CATV systems as common carriers under part
II of the Act, following its prior decision in Frontier Broadcasting v.
Collier, 16 P & F RADIo REG. 1005 (1958).

18 P & F RADIO REG. at 1599.

It further held that it had no statutory power to license CATV systems
under § 301 of the Act because CATV did not come within the definition of "radio station" or "broadcasting" to which § 301 applies. Id.
at 1600-01. The Commission stated that it had no plenary authority to
regulate CATV simply because it was related to or affected broadcasting, which was within its jurisdiction. Id. at 1600. Finally, it held
that it had no power to regulate CATV indirectly through its admitted jurisdiction over microwave facilities which serve CATV. Id.
at 1603-05. On this latter position, the Commission subsequently
changed its mind and was upheld on appeal in Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
951 (1963).
Although the Commission reserved judgment on its authority to
regulate CATV where it could be shown to impair its regulatory
scheme for broadcasting, it seems evident that the Commission did not
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that CATV was a rapidly growing phenomenon which, unless
regulated before it grew too large, might escape regulation until
after it had had a severe economic impact on broadcast stations.
In 1962 the Commission, in Carter Mountain Transmission
Corporation,0 denied a microwave carrier's application for a
license to improve service to CATV customers because of probable economic injury to a local station in competition with
CATV. However, the carrier was given leave to reapply on a
showing that the CATV system would carry the local station
on its cable and that it would not carry programs of stations
which duplicated the local station's programs. This type of protection is generally referred to as "non-duplication" or, more
Later in 1962 the Commission
euphemistically, "exclusivity."
instituted rulemaking proceedings to consider adopting the Carter Mountain type of conditions of carriage and nonduplication
as permanent rules for all common carrier licensees. The proposal was extended a year later to noncommon carrier licensees
as well. 51 These proposals culminated in the Commission's
First Report on CATV Regulation5 2 in 1965, adopting rules requiring mandatory carriage53 and nonduplication for all microwave-served CATV systems.
The carriage and nonduplication rules implemented by the
Commission's First Report followed the regulatory mode of Carter
Mountain. No jurisdiction was asserted directly over the CATV
systems themselves, but only over those served by microwave
facilities. While this disposed of virtually all of the larger systems and those capable of having the greatest economic impact
on broadcast stations, the mode of regulation could hardly be considered completely effective from the point of view of the Coinbelieve there was any basis for asserting jurisdiction even if economic
injury were substantiated.
50. 22 P & F RADIo REG. 193 (1962), affd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
51. See 1965 FCC ANN, REP. 82-83.
52. Note 43 supra.
53. The most controversial aspect of the nonduplication rules was,
and has continued to be, the question of the duration of the nonduplication protection. Over the bitter opposition of CATV interests, who
wanted no more than simultaneous or at least no more than "same-day"
nonduplication protection, the Commission adopted a period of 30 days
protection, 15 days before broadcast and 15 days after. See e.g., 1965
Hearings on CATV Regulation 133-53 (testimony of President of NCTA).
The extra period was thought essential to protect delayed network
broadcasts and, to a degree, syndicated film broadcasts by local stations. First Report 1768-71. However, the Commission subsequently
reduced the protection period down to "same-day" protection. Second
Report 1747-51.
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mission, or very evenhanded from the point of view of those regulated. Moreover, the carriage and nonduplication rules, originally
the ultimate goal of CATV regulation, had become merely a stopgap measure in the view of the broadcast opponents of CATV
and the Commission. At best they helped correct an unfair
competitive advantage which CATV was considered to have 54 and
alleviated some of its economic impact. These rules did not,
however, correct the basic economic problem which was posed
by CATV, i.e., simple dilution of audience as a result of an increased number of available signals.
Believing that this problem could not be met without more
comprehensive control exercised directly over CATV systems,
and not merely over microwave carriers, the Commission simul5
taneously issued in its FirstReport, a notice of further inquiryu
which proposed, in addition to carriage and nonduplication requirements, broad scale restrictions on CATV operations. In 1966
the Commission released its Second Report on CATV Regulation56 in which it asserted jurisdiction and regulatory authority
over CATV systems directly, irrespective of whether they used
microwave facilities, extended carriage and nonduplication rules
to all CATV systems, and issued comprehensive regulations controlling CATV entry which were aimed principally at distant
carriage of signals by CATV into markets far removed from those
served by the stations whose signals were carried. 57 The Commission asserted its jurisdiction over all CATV systems on the
grounds that its authority under the Act is not confined to regulation of common carriers and licensing of radio stations, but
54. One of the chief grounds relied on by the Commission in its
First Report was that the CATV system has an unfair competitive edge
because: (a) in those homes in which it is hooked up, it can effectively
preclude reception of competitive off-the-air signals, a problem which
Was overcome by requiririg carriage on the cable; and (b) unlike the
broadcast station, CATV does not pay for the programs which it'
takes
from broadcast stations and sells in competition 'with such stations.
This latter problem was alleviated in part by the nonduplication rules
and the carriage rules. See FirstReport 1747-52.,
55. Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule-Making, 4 P & F
RADIO RE(. 2d 1680 (1965).
56. Note 44 supra.
57. The principal purpose served by this type of "distant carriage"
restriction, as opposed to other forms of restriction, is that it enables
the Commission to conform CATV operations to its basic geographical
scheme of allocations for television broadcast stations; and it effectively limits the attractiveness and, hence, growth potential of CATV
systems since, except as permitted within the strict geographical limits,
the CATV system cannot bring in much more than subscribers already
have.

1967]

THE FCC AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

83

8
extends beyond these areas to activities in interstate commerce5
which are an integral part of the radio and television system and
which have an immediate and substantial disruptive effect on the
scheme of regulation adopted by the Commission and approved
by Congress and the courts.5 9
The ultimate effect of the Commission's regulation of CATV
is still uncertain despite the adoption of its Second Report. As
may be expected of any undertaking of this magnitude, it will
be many years before the scope of the rules is fully developed,
and not until this occurs can their true effects be known. Although plainly more far-reaching insofar as a greater number of
persons are involved, the CATV rules are not unique in their
ultimate purpose or effect. The basic theory behind them is
essentially that underlying the Carroll case: 60 Unrestrained
competition can severely curtail the economic support of radio
and television stations causing injured stations to cut back more
expensive programming (which by a somewhat dubious hypotheses is deemed "better" programming) to leave the air permanently, resulting in a loss of broadcast service to the public.

4. ProposedAuthorization and Regulation of SubscriptionTV
Whether to authorize subscription television (STV) on a
permanent basis has been one of the enduring problems of the
Commission since the earliest days of television. In 1955 the
Commission instituted proposed rulemaking to inquire into its
power under the Communications Act to authorize subscription
television and to determine whether such authorization would
be in the public interest.61 After prolonged delay, experimental
operations were licensed in Hartford, Connecticut.62 At the ter58. Although the question whether CATV systems which operate
in the confines of one state operate in interstate commerce was the
subject of considerable dispute by CATV interests, this seems the
least troublesome aspect of the problem. See Idaho Microwave, Inc.
v. FCC, 352 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Ward v. Northern Ohio Tel. Co.,
300 F.2d 816 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 820 (1962).
59. See Second Report 1725-32; Notice of Inquiry and Notice of
Proposed Rule-Making, Regulation of CATV, 4 P & F RADIo REG. 2d
1680, 1707-12 (1965). On congressional and judicial approval, see H.R.
REP. No. 1559, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962) (approving the system of
service through diverse local stations); Logansport Broadcasting Corp.
v. United States, 210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (upholding the Commission's Sixth Report and Order).
60.

258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

61. 20 Fed. Reg. 988 (1955).
62. Hartford Phonevision Co., 20 P & F RADio REG. 754 (1961),
aff'd, Connecticut Comm. Against Pay TV v. FCC, 301 F.2d 835 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 816 (1962).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:67

mination of the trial period in Hartford, further proceedings were
commenced to study the question anew in light of the results of
0 3
this test.
To make an initial investigation and prepare a report on the
question, three commissioners were appointed as a Subscription
Television Committee. After some two years of further rulemaking proceedings, the STV Committee has recently submitted
its report in which it proposes for adoption by the full Commission permanent authorization of STV, but with numerous restrictions and limitations.6 4 The full Commission, apparently
still undecided, has declined to act without still further comment
and argument from the industry and other interested parties.0 5
Accordingly, the matter is still pending and, after twelve years
in limbo, the fate of STV is still undecided.
The central issue on which regulatory policy has been and
is being debated is analogous to the issue raised by the sudden
rapid growth of CATV: the problem of economic impact on
free television broadcasting. The manner of economic impact is,
however, distinct. Although there would be direct diversion of
audience from free television to pay television, the principal
impact of STV, according to its opponents, is the possible diversion or siphoning of programs and talent from free television.
This siphoning argument is based on the conclusion that STV
could outbid conventional television's advertising sponsors for
program talent. Of principal concern is the supposed ability of
STV to outbid free television for movies and major sports events.
With this type of programming lost to STV, free television would
be unable to generate sufficient advertising revenues to compete
for an audience and would eventually lose out to STV. At that
point, according to the STV opponents, all television would become pay television. 66
The primary concerns of the STV Committee with regard
to the economic impact of STV are two: the possible preemption
of broadcast time by STV operations, particularly in prime-time
viewing hours; 67 and the siphoning of programs and program
talent from free television to STV.68 As protection against these
63.

Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of In-

quiry, 7 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1501 (1966).
64. Report of the Subscription Television Committee to the FCC,

10 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1617 (1967) [hereinafter cited as STV Report].
65. 10 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1617 (:1967). FCC 67-819 (July 14,
1967).
66. See STV Report 1654-57.
67. Id. at 1660-61, 1668-79.
68. Id. at 1661.
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dangers to free television, the Committee has proposed that a
number of restrictions be placed on STV market entry and STV
operations. In order to ensure that at least three network services and one independent service could be received in such
markets and to minimize the number of hours of free television
which would be preempted, the Committee would first restrict
STV operations to markets receiving Grade A commercial service from five stations, of which the STV station may be one.6 9
Further, it would permit only one STV operation in any market.70 To protect against program and talent siphoning, the
STV Committee has proposed regulations which have greater
constitutional implications insofar as they are aimed directly at
the kind of programming STV may present. The Committee has
proposed prohibiting STY from presenting feature films older
than two years from the time of first release to theatres on the
rationale that movies newer than two years are not generally
available to free television. In addition, it has proposed prohibiting STV from carrying current sports events which were regularly carried live on free television in the community in which
the STV operates, and prohibiting STV from presenting continuing series programs which are a mainstay of free television.
Finally, it proposes limiting the total percentage of time which
STV may devote to feature films and sports to no more than
ninety per cent of a station's STV programming annually and no
7 1
more than ninety-five per cent monthly.
As in the case of the restrictions on CATV market entry and
operations, the central policy of the above regulations is to restrict competition to the extent deemed necessary to preserve
the continuation of free television broadcast service. Essentially,
it is a reflection of the principles of the Carroll case. It is in
these terms that the constitutional implications of the Commission's regulation of CATV and pay television and its economic
regulation in general must be considered.

C. FnRST AMENDmENT

IIMPLICATIONS

OF ECONoI Ic REGULATION

The foregoing discussion of the general regulatory framework within which the Commission operates is not intended to
suggest that the entire regulatory scheme under the Communications Act has serious first amendment implications. All aspects of Commission regulation, whether they be technical, so69. Id. at 1668-73; proposed rules, § 73.642, id. at 1738.
70. Id. at 1678-79; proposed rules, § 73.642, id. at 1738.
71. Id. at 1702-14; proposed rules, § 73.643, id. at 1740, app. D.
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cial, or economic, have some measure of impact on free speech.
However, no one would seriously contend today that the Commission is without constitutional power to license the use of radio
frequencies, and, as part of such a licensing scheme, to impose
such technical restraints and limitations as are necessary to ensure a fair, equitable, and efficient distribution and use of such
frequencies. Minimum restraints through licensing are necessary in order that there be any effective radio communication,
a fact made clear by the experience of the 1920's. To this extent
the clich6 that Commission regulation makes possible the exercise of free speech in radio communications is fair and accurate.
Moreover, beyond the very narrow engineering aspects of allocation of frequencies, it must be accepted that the Commission may set a very broad limit on the type of use to which frequencies may be put. Thus, it seems clearly appropriate to require licensees in the Aviation Radio Service to restrict their
communications to those having some relationship to aviation.
Nor does it do violence to the first amendment72to restrict their
use still further and to prohibit private chit-chat.
However, to concede all this sheds little light on the problem,
for what is at issue here is not whether the Commission should
have and does have the constitutional power to act as a traffic
cop of the airways. The question here is to what extent the
Commission may constitutionally restrain free speech on radio
and television by regulating economic conditions in the industry.
The NBC case7 3 is generally regarded as the touchstone for
measuring the constitutionality of Commission regulation. Indeed, in the field of economic and program regulation of radio
and television, the NBC opinion affirming the Commission's
power to regulate chain broadcasting has become the vade
mecum of the Commission in exercising regulatory powers in
nontechnical areas. One can scarcely pick up a single case in
which the Commission's regulatory authority is in question where
some portion of Justice Frankfurter's opinion is not quoted as a
about the Commission's statutory
talisman to dispel all doubts
74
and constitutional power.
72. See Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp. v. United States, 345
F.2d 278, 281 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J.), upholding against first
amendment challenge Commission regulations prohibiting the use of
radio facilities in the Citizens Radio Service as a "hobby" or a "diversion."
73.
(1943).

74.

National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.

190

The Commission is not alone in.so regarding NBC. See, e.g.,
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The importance of the NBC case lies not in the nature of the
specific regulation upheld but in Justice Frankfurter's sweeping
pronouncements on the comprehensive powers 75 with which
Congress endowed the Commission and his almost equally broad
pronouncements on the constitutionality of Commission exercise
of such powers. Of primary importance, of course, is the scope
of the latter. Rejecting a challenge to the regulations based on
the first amendment, Justice Frankfurter concluded for the majority:
The Regulations, even if valid in all other respects, must fall
because they abridge, say the appellants, their right of free
speech. If that be so, it would follow that every person whose
application for a license to operate a station is denied by the
Commission is thereby denied his constitutional right of free
speech. Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to
use the limited facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its
unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of
expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it
cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must be denied.
But Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose
among applicants upon the basis of their political, economic or
social views, or upon any other capricious basis. If it did, or
if the Commission by these Regulations proposed a choice among
applicants upon some such basis, the issue before us would be
wholly different ....

The right of free speech does not in-

clude, however, the right to use the facilities of radio without a
license. The licensing system established by Congress in the
Communications Act of 1934 was a proper exercise of its power
over commerce. The standard it provided for the licensing of
stations was the 'public interest, convenience, or necessity.' Dethe Act,
nial of a station license on that
76 ground, if valid under
is not a denial of free speech.
Accepting this opinion at face value, it is difficult to find
any significant first amendment limitations on the authority of
the Commission to regulate radio and television broadcasting,
at least in the area of economic regulation,7 7 so long as it can be
Barron, The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine:
An Evaluation, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 2 n.6 (1961): "The [NBC]
opinion . . . is generally regarded as having sounded the death knell

for the argument that government regulation of broadcasting violated
the licensee's right of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment." Although this statement of the effect of NBC in silencing first
amendment objections to broadcast regulation is plain hyperbole, it is
nevertheless indicative of a widespread, if wholly uncritical, acceptance of NBC as dispositive of constitutional issues in broadcast regulation.
75. 319 U.S. at 217.
76. Id. at 226-27.
77. However, NBC is read as broadly permissive in the case of
program regulation as well as economic regulation.
in Parts II & HI infra.

This is discussed
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found that the standard of public interest, convenience, or necessity is satisfied. At the same time, however, Justice Frankfurter's opinion seems fundamentally wrong insofar as it suggests an unacceptably broad license for Commission regulation,
particularly in the field of programming. At the heart of Frankfurter's reasoning is the classic cliche: "Unlike other modes of
expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its
modes of exunique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other
78
regulation.
governmental
to
subject
is
pression, it
This argument, which has been assiduously trotted out on
7
every appropriate occasion, has several major defects. sa First,
contrary to common assumption, the radio broadcast spectrum
is not now, and may never be, saturated. While the technical
limitations on entry into broadcasting are real enough, the economic limitations are probably more restrictive. The economic
barriers to entry into radio broadcasting are, however, far less
restrictive than in the case of media such as newspapers, which
lie essentially beyond public control. Second, there are more
competitive outlets for expression in radio and television than
there are in the newspaper media-or probably in all major publications media combined. This disparity between the number
of different radio and television outlets and the number of
newsprint media is increasing. Third, the mere fact that there
are barriers to entry into the communications media, be it newspapers or radio and television, does not in itself resolve the
problem of the kinds of control that are permissible and how
narrow the focus on restraint of free speech may be.
The defect of Justice Frankfurter's approach to the constitutional issue is illustrated by the Commission's regulation of community antenna television. The CATV regulations prohibiting
duplication of the programs of local broadcast stations by programs carried on CATV systems have been twice upheld against
constitutional challenge. In the Carter Mountain case7 9 the
court rejected the argument that t:ae Commission's nonduplication protection for local television stations contravened the
first amendment. Essentially the court reasoned that since
some restraint on complete freedom is inherent in all licensing
regulation of radio communications,
it may be assumed that any denial of a license to transmit
radio or television programs keeps off the air, and hence de78.

319 U.S. at 226.

78a. See generally Part III infra.

79. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
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prives the public of, the material which the applicant desires
to communicate. But that does not mean that the Commission
must grant every license which is requested. Nor does it mean
that the whole statutory system of regulation is invalid. Quite
the contrary is true: a denial of a station license, validly made
because the standard of 'public interest, convenience,8 or necessity' has not been met, is not a denial of free speech. 0
On the same reasoning, the court again upheld the nonduplication rules against first amendment challenge in Idaho Microwave, Inc. v. FCC.81
Neither decision deals with the constitutional issue in a
satisfactory way. To be sure, licensing of radio communications
involves a degree of restraint. The mere fact that some restraint
may be inherent in legitimate licensing does not in itself, however, justify this particular form of regulation nor, indeed, does
it bestow a constitutional carte blanche on all forms and all degrees of regulation. 2 Not even the FCC would contend, for
example, that the licensing power includes the power to direct
every aspect of the licensee's operations, including the particular
programs presented. Moreover the reasoning is inapposite in
the case of direct regulation of CATV where there is no prevailing scheme of licensing to which regulation can be said to be an
incidental restraint.
While the constitutional issue was inadequately analyzed in
Carter Mountain and Idaho Microwave, it was almost ignored in
Buckeye Cablevision,Inc. v. FCC.8 3 In Buckeye the court upheld
the CATV regulations restricting carriage by the system of distant signals. Unlike Carter Mountain and Idaho Microwave the
rules here were directed against CATV systems themselves and
were not confined to regulating microwave carriers within the
licensing jurisdiction of the Commission. The two principal
challenges to the rules were that the Commission was without
statutory jurisdiction to regulate CATV and, more fundamentally, that the rules violated the first amendment insofar as they
precluded the system from carrying signals originating beyond a
specified distance from the CATV station. Affirming the Commission's jurisdiction to regulate CATV systems directly, the
court gave little more than the back of its hand to the first
amendment challenge, stating that "the restraint imposed by the
rules is no more than is reasonably required to effectuate the
80. Id. at 364.
81. 352 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
82. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
83. 10 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 2029 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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public interest requirements of the Act."8' 4 The court then
cited NBC and CarterMountain for support.
Taken at face value, this rather offhand statement suggests
the preposterous conclusion that the Constitution is circumscribed by an act of Congress and that, so long as the Commission's actions are within the scope of its legislative mandate,
there are no first amendment restrictions. Undoubtedly the
court did not intend such a sweeping abdication to Congress of
the judicial power to determine the scope of the first amendment. However, its refusal to go beyond the question of the
legislatively created public interest standard to resolve the constitutional issue suggests just such an abdication.
The court's failure to deal with the first amendment issue
is not corrected by its reliance on the CarterMountain and NBC
cases. As previously noted, the reasoning of CarterMountain is
entirely inadequate since the validity of some types and degrees
of restraint does not justify all types and all degrees of restraint.
Nor is the issue resolved by citing IBC. Even if the technical
barriers to entry and the fact that radio is inherently not available to all justify Commission regulation of radio and television
broadcasting, this clearly does not support regulation of CATV.
Unlike broadcasting, CATV transmits its signals entirely by
wire, and except to a negligible degree 85 transmission by wire
does not interfere with other stations. From a technical viewpoint, CATV is available to all. If, therefore, Justice Frankfurter's scarcity argument is relied on as the constitutional basis
for regulating radio and television, it follows that CATV is no
more constitutionally subject to regulation of entry than newspapers, magazines, or other communications media. The NBC
case, far from providing support for Commission regulation, as
concluded by the Commission, 6 really supports the opposite re84. Id. at 2034. Buckeye conflicts with an earlier decision in the
Ninth Circuit, Southwestern Cable Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 118
(9th Cir. 1967), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3068 (U.S. July 13,
1967), holding that the commission had no statutory jurisdiction over
non-microwave CATV.
85. Even radio transmissions by wire emit some degree of spurious
radiation which may interfere with radio broadcast signals. These spurious emissions are not of major significance, however, and can be practically eliminated by use of heavy cable. The Commission's regulations
have long provided for control of such spurious emissions long before
CATV itself was regulated. See 47 C.F.R. § 15.1 (1967).
86. See Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule-Making,
Regulation of CATV, 4 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1679, 1709-10 (1965); see
also CATV Regulation (Petition for Reconsideration of Second Report),
8 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1677, 1681-82 (1967) (rejecting argument that
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suit. Following Justice Frankfurter's scarcity argument to its
logical conclusion, it must be seen that abandonment of CATV
regulation and the supplanting of broadcasting with CATV and
other forms of wire communication would do away with the entire problem of spectrum scarcity and with it the entire ostensible
basis for the regulatory scheme established by the Communications Act of 1934.
Notwithstanding what seem to be obvious fallacies in the
reasoning underlying the NBC, Carter Mountain, and Buckeye
cases, it does not necessarily follow that the economic regulation
sustained in those decisions is unconstitutional. The problem is
not that these decisions have reached the wrong result but that
they have traveled the wrong path. On grounds other than
those advanced in the decisions, the Commission's economic regulation and its proposed subscription television regulations seem
defensible even under the strictest application of the first
amendment.
Radio, television, newspaper publication, and theatre are,
within limits, subject to general economic restraints and regulations. For example, no one doubts any longer that communications media, whether or not their facilities are inherently available to all, are subject to the antitrust laws. In Associated
Press v. United States 87 the Court, per Justice Black, held that
the antitrust laws prohibited the Associated Press from restricting member newspapers from furnishing news to nonmember
newspapers. The Court rejected the contention that this application of the antitrust laws to a news media was in violation of
the first amendment.
It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for
freedom of the press which prompted adoption of the First
Amendment should be read as a command that the government
was without power to protect that freedom. The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against application of
the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on the assumption that the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a
command that the government itself shall not impede the free
flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations
a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally
guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom for
all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the
Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from pubregulation unconstitutionally restrains free speech, relying in part on

NBC).

87. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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lishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression
of that freedom by private interests. The First Amendment affords not the slightest support for the contention that a combination to restrain trade in news and views has any constitutional immunityS 8s

It may be argued that the AP antitrust case disposes of the
constitutional challenge to regulations against monopoly but not
of the converse, i.e., regulations which have the effect of further-

ing economic concentration, and economic regulation of the kind
reflected in Carroll, CATV regulation, and the proposed regulation of STV operations is directly contrary to regulation of the
type upheld in the AP case since the effect really is a measure of
protection of economic concentration.
One critic of the policy of imposing barriers to entry on economic grounds has contended that this latter type of economic
regulation, in contrast to antimonopo.y regulation, is unconstitutional.8 9 He concludes that the chain broadcasting rules upheld
in NBC flow logically from the Court's recognition of the scarcity
of available frequencies," but economic regulation of entry does
not. But this distinction between regulatory limits on entry
and regulatory limits on monopoly simply reflects a bias in favor
of strong competition at all costs. However sound this view may
be as a matter of economic or social policy, it seems rather farfetched to give it constitutional stature.
While it is true that economic regulation of the type considered in the Carroll case, the Commission's CATV regulation
or its proposed regulation of STV may in a very real sense be
economic protectionism, 91 it is nevertheless a protectionism undertaken to effect the purpose the antitrust laws were supposed
88. Id. at 20 (footnote omitted). The Court also relied in part on
its decision in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937), in
which it upheld against first amendment challenge the application of
the National Labor Relations Act to AP. See note 272 infra and accompanying text. It also relied on its prior decision in Indiana Farmer's
Guide Co. v. Prairie Farmer Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934), involving the
application of the antitrust laws to a newspaper. However, in Prairie
Farmerthe first amendment issue was not raised or discussed.
89. Givens, Refusal of Radio and Television Licenses on Economic
Grounds, 46 VA. L. REV. 1391, 1400-03 (1960). Cf. Weaver v. Jordan,
64 Cal. 2d 235, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 411 P.2d 289 (1966), which invalidated
a state statute banning subscription television (by wire) and distinguished NBC on grounds that the rules there were designed to eliminate
monopoly whereas the statute here fostered monopoly.
90. Givens, supra note 89, at 1401-02.
91. See Cole, Community Antenna Television, The Broadcaster
Establishment, and the Federal Regulator, 14 Amv. U.L. REV. 124-25,
142-45 (1965).
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by the Court in the AP case to serve-diversity of opinion. The
rationale expressed by the Commission for its regulation of CATV
is that CATV, left to itself, may seriously curtail if not destroy
many of the local broadcast outlets whose continued existence is
necessary to maintain diversified sources of free speech and
opinion.
More fundamentally, the constitutionality of general economic regulation does not necessarily turn on whether the regulation has the purpose or effect of benefiting free speech itself. This
is clearly the necessary conclusion to be drawn from Associated
Press v. NLRB9 2 which upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act as applied to the press. Here the
NLRB had entered a cease and desist order against AP under section 7 of the Act ordering it, among other things, to reinstate a
member of its editorial staff whom it had discharged. AP argued
that the Act, as applied to it in this manner, violated the first
amendment. AP contended that in hiring and firing
it must have absolute and unrestricted freedom to employ and
to discharge those who, like Watson, [the discharged employee]
edit the news ...

and that the Associated Press cannot be

free to furnish unbiased and impartial news reports unless it is
equally free to determine for itself the partiality or bias of edi[A]ny regulation protective of union
torial employees....
activities, or the right collectively to bargain on the part of
is necessarily an invalid invasion of the freesuch employees, 93
dom of the press.
The Court rejected the contention as irrelevant since no bias on
the part of the employee had been shown. The contention was
also rejected as an unsound generalization, the Court noting
[t]he business of the Associated Press is not immune from regulation because it is an agency of the press. The publisher of a
from the application of
newspaper has
94 no special immunity
general laws.
92. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
93. Id. at 131.
94. Id. at 132. For an extended treatment of "general legislation"
to which the "press," including radio, is subject, see 2 Z. CE[xEE,
GOVERNMENT AND MASs COMMUNICATIONS

500-678 (Comm'n on Free-

dom of the Press ed. 1953). Chafee identifies five types of "general
burdens" in this regard: (1) taxation, (2) laws against unfair competition, (3) rationing of paper (not, of course, applicable to radio), (4)
labor laws, and (5) antitrust laws. Id. at 501. Of all of these general
burdens, Chafee regards the application of the antitrust laws to communications industries as the most troublesome in its potential for
interference with freedom of the press. Id. at 666-74. Chafee's concern
in this respect seems unjustified. As he himself recognizes, the antitrust
laws have not been applied to communications industries in such a
manner as to raise any imminent threat to freedom of speech and the
press. Nor is there anything which suggests that such an application
is likely in the future.
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Unlike the AP antitrust case discussed above, the AP labor
case does not in any respect turn on a presumed, ultimate benefit to the goal of free speech. It cannot be said, for example, that
application of the labor laws, unlike the antitrust laws, has the
effect of fostering diversity. The rationale of the AP labor case
is, very simply, that communications media as commercial enterprises are no less subject to general social regulation merely because they are in the business of dissemination of news and
opinion.
The same rationale, which seems quite obviously sound as
a principle of constitutional law, applies to radio and television
as well as to newspapers. It applies regardless of whether radio
and television is distributed through a spectrum which is inherently not available to all or by means of wire which is.2
It is important to stress that acceptance of this rationale in
support of the constitutionality of the Commission's regulations
is not necessarily an acceptance of the Commission's statutory
power. It is particularly necessary to distinguish statutory from
constitutional authority in the CALTV area. 96 Moreover, in
order to accept this rationale, one need not accept the necessity
or the wisdom of the Commission's regulatory policy in all respects. In the case of CATV regulation one might take the view
that the Commission's regulation goes too far. One can even
take the extreme view that the Cornission's regulatory policies
in this area are the handiwork of the economically and politi95. But see Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537,
411 P.2d 289 (1966), holding unconstitutional under the state constitution and the first amendment a statute banning subscription television.
The result seems dubious. Even though the statute seemed ill-advised,
it does not seem unconstitutional to proscribe certain methods of communications on general economic or other grounds not going to the
content of the speech. See cases discussed in text above; cf. Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). The court conceded the validity of general regulatory restraints of the type upheld in Kovacs or in the AP
cases, but struck down the statute here because it went beyond regulation and banned subscription television entirely. But the distinction
seems thin. The Act did not ban all television communications but
only the business of charging directly for television. Query whether the
extent of the restraint on such an incident of communications and not
directed to the content of the communications goes any further than
the restraint upheld in Kovacs or restraints imposed in applying general
economic regulation of the type sustained in the AP cases.
96. That is, statutory authority in the jurisdictional sense. Of
course, since § 326 of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1964), is in substance an
incorporation of the first amendment's prohibition of "censorship," anything which unconstitutionally interferes with free speech also violates
§ 326.
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cally influential members of the industry.97 Similarly one might
conclude that the proposed restrictions on STV operations, such
as limiting STV to markets having five or more commercial services, are unnecessary and overly protectionistic. But an unwise or unnecessary policy does not become transformed into an
unconstitutional policy merely because free expression is in some
way involved. If this were the case, there are many antitrust,
labor, social, and economic measures in effect today which might
well be unconstitutional as applied to any form of communications media.
While it might be granted that the Commission could limit
or proscribe altogether a CATV system's competition with broadcast stations in certain markets where this is deemed necessary
to the public interest, it is arguable that the Commission cannot
achieve this same result by proscribing certain types of CATV
programming and that it therefore cannot impose restrictions
simply because the CATV programs duplicate local programming
or because they originate in a "distant market." In the abstract,
the argument has a certain persuasiveness. Certainly the power
to achieve a given economic result such as protection from "disruptive" competition does not include the power to achieve it by
any and all means. Assuming the power of the Commission to
98
preclude CATV entry into certain markets entirely, it clearly
cannot impose unconstitutional restrictions or conditions on entry.0 Plainly the Commission could not tell a CATV system that
it could operate in a given locale, but only on the condition that
it carry such particular programs as the Commission approved
as suitable for the residents of that locale.
However, the mere fact that a particular program classification is used to implement the regulatory objective does not necessarily indicate that the Commission is engaged in censorship. The
Commission's CATV program nonduplication rules which, in general, preclude a CATV system from carring television programs
which duplicate the programs carried on the same day by local
broadcast stations, illustrate the problem. Although the effect
might be to proscribe a particular classification of programming,
the classification is a neutral one, based not on program content or
quality but simply on the timing and manner of presentation. The
97. See Cole, supra note 91.
98. But see Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537,
411 P.2d 289 (1966).
99. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Hannegan v.
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1946); Terral v. Burke Constr. 'Co.,
257 U.S. 529 (1922).
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effect is not to keep such programming from being presented but
to restrict the number of entirely duplicative presentations at substantially the same time. Thus, what is really involved here is
not a true classification of programs but a classification of signals.
If it is accepted that economic regulation in general is constitutional, then given a justifiable economic objective such as the
elimination of duplicate programming, such restraints as the
CATV nonduplication rule seem constitutional. 10 0
An analogous albeit somewhat more troublesome problem
is presented by the new subscription television regulations proposed by the Commission's STV Committee. The proposal to
prohibit broadcast of feature films which are more than two
years old, current sports events regularly carried live on local
conventional stations, series-type programs, and combined feature film and sports totaling more than ninety per cent of a station's annual STV programming would appear to go beyond the
kind of CATV nonduplication protection previously discussed.
Here certain types of programs, not merely the manner of their
presentation, are singled out and forbidden to be carried on STV.
Such predetermination of allowable program types would seem
clearly unconstitutional if imposed as a flat restraint against
presentation on television altogether.
However, such a conclusion is not dispositive here. By prohibiting STV from carrying movies which are more than two
years old, the Commission would not be attempting to make a
program judgment about the relative quality or acceptability
vel non of older movies. It would instead be acting on the economic prediction that presentation of older films by STV would
siphon such programming away from free television thereby impairing the vitality of the latter.1 0 1 The same economic judgment underlies the proposed regulation which would prohibit
STV from carrying current sports events, regularly carried live
103
on free television,'1 2 and from carrying series-type programs,
which, along with movies, have been a mainstay of free televi100. The same reasoning would hold true of the CATV rules restricting carriage of "distant" signals, i.e., signals originating beyond a
certain distance from the community served by the CATV system.
Here regulation is again drawn on a classification of program signals, a
differentiation between local and distant signals. Like nonduplication,
the classification is not based on a judgment of program quality or
desirability but on the purely neutral factor of distance (which again is
used as a means of achieving a measure of economic protection).
101. See STV Report 1705-07.
102. See id. at 1707-13.
103. See id. at 1714.
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sion. As in the case of CATV nonduplication regulation, the aim
of these rules is not to render judgment on particular types of
programs but rather to achieve certain economic goals based on
classifications which relate to programming types. As the STV
Committee Report points out, such a structuring of the channels
of distribution seems entirely consistent with the first amendment, even though it necessarily places some limitation on the
dissemination of speech. 104
The foregoing does not mean, of course, that the Commission
has a constitutionally free rein to do as it pleases in the field of
economic regulation. More particularly, it does not mean that,
under the guise of economic or social regulation fostering diversity of speech, it can control the speech itself to ensure that the
dissemination of ideas is sufficiently diverse according to its judgment. In this respect, the STV Committee's proposal to restrict
a station's annual STV programming to not more than ninety
per cent feature film and sports programs clearly seems to go beyond any general economic regulation. The sole basis for such a
rule is to force STV to present cultural programming. 105 Such a
rule is based squarely on a judgment as to the type of programming deemed to be desirable, a judgment which goes beyond general economic regulation and enters, subtly but surely, into the
area of program regulation, where the Commission's regulatory
policies and actions seem to be of far more doubtful constitutional validity.
II. REGULATION AND CONTROL OF PROGRAMMING
While the first amendment implications of the Commission's
activity in the field of economic regulation have received relatively little attention, the Commission's regulatory efforts in the
field of programming have provoked considerable comment.
This is understandable in view of the far more doubtful constitutionality of many of its activities and policies in program
regulation. The analysis of the constitutional implications of
the Commission's regulation of programming has, however,
tended to be undiscriminating. Little attention has been given to
the different regulatory measures which control or influence programming and to the distinct effects of and the different constitutional problems raised by such measures.
104. Id. at 1705. Accepting this argument, however, I do not, for
reasons previously set forth at length, subscribe to the Committee's
reliance on the sweeping pronouncements laid down in the NBC case
as support for its proposed regulation. See id. at 1704-05.
105. See id. at 1712-13.
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A. DIRECT RESTRAINTS AGAINST ILLEGAL, HARMFUL, OR OFFENSIVE
PROGRAM5MG

1.

CommissionActions From Dr. Brinkley to Pacifica

To date the Commission has instituted direct action against
a station for broadcast of particular programs in only a few
cases. These include defamatory programs, 106 programs involving improper and harmful medical advice 0 7 or medical advertising,108 broadcasts relating to illegal lotteries,109 broadcasts of
certain horseracing information," 0 broadcasts of fraudulent contests,'
and "offensive" progranm.ing." 2 In several such
cases, however, although the Commftssion instituted action by
issuing a show cause order or by instituting a hearing on license
revocation or renewal, it has taken no final action either because
it was persuaded that the programming was in fact satisfactory" 3
or because it was satisfied that the licensee's "bad" performance
would not be repeated." 4
The earliest case involving direct restraint in the regulation
of programming is the Dr. Brinkley case." 5 While much has been
made of this famous case, more attention has been given to the
atrocious opinion by the court of appeals in affirming the Radio
Commission's action than to the facts which led the Commission
to refuse to renew Dr. Brinkley's license for a radio station. Dr.
Brinkley controlled a radio station, a pharmaceutical associa106. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62
F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1932).

107. KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d

670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
108. See WSBC, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 293 (1936).
109. WRBL Radio Station, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 687 (1936).
110. Community Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 13 P & F RADIo REG. 179
(1955).
111. KWK Radio, Inc., 25 P & F. RADIO REG. 577 (1963); cf. Melody
Music, Inc., 6 P & F. RADIo REG. 2d 973 (1966) (involvement in fixed

quiz show not involving station considered as bearing on "character"
of renewal applicant); Eleven Ten Broadcasting, 22 P & F RADio REG.
699 (1962) (also involving other matters, however, such as program
log falsification).
112. Mile High Stations, Inc., 20 P & F RADIO REG. 345 (1960);
Pacifica Foundation, 1 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 747 (1964) (licensee exonerated); cf. Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 23 P & F RADIO REG. 483
(1961),

a-f'd sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964) (also involved, however, misrepresentations to Commission).
113. See Pacifica Foundation, 1 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 747 (1964).
114. See Mile High Stations, 20 P &F RADIO REG. 345 (1960).
115. KFK.B Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d
670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
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tion, and a hospital which he operated in a common interest. The
hospital was advertised over the station and paid a substantial
amount to the station each month for this advertising. The
pharmaceutical association was composed of druggists who dispensed medical preparations prepared according to Brinkley's
formulas. Each member of the association paid a nominal fee to
the station for use of the formulas. For three and one-half hours
daily, Brinkley personally broadcast a program over the station
devoted to diagnosing and prescribing treatment for cases from
symptoms given in letters addressed to Brinkley or the station.
Predictably, the good doctor's treatment was in almost all cases
to prescribe one of his prepared tonics.
It was against this background that the Radio Commission
denied Brinkley's application for renewal. On appeal the decision was affirmed by the court of appeals on the grounds that:
(a) the operations of KFKB were being used for the purely private purpose of furthering Dr. Brinkley's other business and
professional interests with no regard for the public interest; and
(b) that use of the station for diagnosing the problems of and
prescribing treatment for patients whom Brinkley had never
even seen was inimical to the public health and safety and, therefore, was not in the public interest.
In 1936 the Commission set down for hearing a renewal application by a licensee which had carried advertisements of two
medical preparations. One of these was prepared and sponsored
by a person convicted of practicing medicine without a license,
while the other was prepared and sponsored by a person convicted of violating the Food and Drug Act and of fraudulent use of
the mails in promoting the advertised preparations. However,
because the licensee had previously cancelled the advertisements, apparently after learning of these facts regarding the
sponsors, and had an otherwise good record, the license was renewed." 6
Shortly after the Radio Commission had refused to permit
Dr. Brinkley to continue to use radio frequencies to further his
"organized charlatanism," it was confronted with the Reverend
Doctor Shuler, another "doctor," of similarly doubtful character.1 7 The Radio Commission refused to renew Shuler's broadcast license based on findings that he was using his licensed frequency for defamatory broadcasts and for obstructing the orderly
116. WSBC, Inc., 2 F.C.C. 293 (1936).
117. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n,
62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1932).
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administration of public justice. As in the BrinkZey case, the
Commission's action seems clearly justified on the facts. Shuler's
defamatory broadcasts evidently consisted of more than an occasional lapse of caution and judgment in criticizing individuals.
In reviewing the evidence on which the Commission made its
finding, the court of appeals noted tha; Shuler
not satisfied with attacking the judges of the courts in cases
then pending before them, attacked the bar association for its
activities in recommending judges, charging it with ulterior and
sinister purposes. With no more justification, he charged particular judges with sundry immoral acts. He made defamatory
statements against the board of health. He charged that the
labor temple in Los Angeles was a bootlegging and gambling
joint.... On one occasion he announced over the radio that
he had certain damaging information against a prominent unnamed man which, unless a contribution (presumably to the
church) of a hundred dollars was forthcoming, he would disHe alluded slightingly to the Jews as a race, and
close ....
Roman Catholic relimade frequent and bitter attacks on the
gion and its relations to government." 8
On these findings the court of appeals, not surprisingly, held
that the Commission's refusal to renew Shuler's license was not
a violation of the first amendment.
Pursuant to section 1304 of the United States Criminal
Code," 9 the Commission has long scrutinized broadcasts of infor,
mation about prize-giving schemes and taken action against those
found to be lotteries. The Commission's power, indeed, its duty to
enforce the mandate of section 1304 and to implement it by means
of general rule or individual decisions was20 expressly affirmed in
FCC v. American BroadcastingCompany.
The Commission has also proscribed the broadcast of horseracing information in a manner and under such circumstances
that it is evident that the information is being used by bookmakers and others for illegal gambling purposes. 21
118. 62 F.2d at 852.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964), formerly § 316 of the Communications Act of 1934:
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio station for which a
license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever, operating any such station, knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any advertisement of or information concerning any
lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of
the prizes drawn or awarded by means of any such lottery,
gift enterprise, or scheme, whether said list contains any part
or all of such prizes, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Each day's broadcasting shall constitute a separate offense.
120. 347 U.S. 284, 289 (1954). The Court held, however, that the
rules there adopted by the Commission were too broad.
121. See Community Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 13 P & F RADIO REG.
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An extension of its action in the Brinkley case and its action
in lottery and horseracing cases is the action taken by the Commission against programs involving some form of fraudulent contest. In Eleven Ten Broadcasting Corp. 122 the Commission denied the renewal of a station's license on findings that the licensee
had, among other things, conducted "fraudulent" contests over its
station. Although the Commission evidently considered the
fraudulent contest alone sufficient to support denial of the license, it relied on other grounds, including deliberate falsification
of the station's program logs and other misrepresentations to
support its action. Subsequently, in KWK Radio, Inc.,' 23 the
Commission was confronted with a similar fraudulent contest,
except that the "fraudulent" program itself was the only matter
before it. The Commission revoked the station's license on the
basis of findings that it had conducted fraudulent contests which,
the Commission found, resulted in deception to the public, inconvenience, "public disorder," and in some instances actual
property damage.'2 4
Related to the KWK case is the Commission's more recent
action in making a short-term renewal grant in Melody Music,
Inc., 25 which grew out of the famous quiz show scandal of 1959

in which some contestants on a popular quiz program were given
the answers to the questions beforehand. There, however, the
matter was considered in a context somewhat different from that
in KWK. In Melody Music the station itself had not been held
responsible for the deceptive quiz program. One, of the two
principals of the station had, however, been involved in the
rigged contest. As a result the Commission set the renewal application down for a hearing on the character qualifications of
the two principals. In its first opinion 26 the Commission denied
the renewal application of the station on these grounds. On ap-7
peal, the court of appeals for the District of Columbia reversed,P
stating that the Commission had treated the licensee differently
179 (1955) (also discussing other cases).

A brief statement of Com-

mission policy guidelines as to the types of horseracing broadcasts
which are considered questionable by the Commission *was subsequently issued in Broadcast of Horse Racing Information, 22 P & F
RADIO REG. 417 (1961), reaff'd, Broadcast of Horse Racing Information,
2 P & F RADio REG. 2d 1609 (1964).
122. 22 P & F RADio REG. 699 (1962).
123. 25 P & F RADIO REG. 577 (1963).
124. Id. at 581-82.
125. 6 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 973 (1966).

126. 2 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 571 (1904).
127. 345 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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here than it had in NBC, 1 28 where the Commission had renewed

NBC's license notwithstanding the fact that its parent corporation
(RCA) had violated the antitrust laws. The evident discrimination was made even more patent by the fact that in Melody,
unlike NBC where a violation of law -was involved, the rigging of
quiz shows was not at that time a violation of law. 129 On remand
the Commission was able to avoid -the impossible task of distinguishing the case from other cases in which it renewed the
licenses of applicants convicted of violating the antitrust laws.
The principals had applied to assign. the license to other, presumably untainted, persons. Seizing this opportunity to rescue
itself from a bad position, the Commission granted a short-term
renewal on condition that the present licensee divest itself of its
broadcast interest.
The foregoing cases all dealt with programs which were
fraudulent, illegal, or at least patently harmful. Several recent
cases focus on a more difficult problem: control of programming deemed to be improper, indecent, or offensive. At the present time, there remains some uncertainty whether the Commission will attempt any direct restraint on programming which
it deems merely offensive and, if it does, what circumstances
might prompt it to take direct action against such programming.
In Mile High Stations, Inc., 3 0 -the Commission issued an
order to show cause why an AM license should not be revoked
where the station's announcer had made a number of offcolor
remarks over a period of several months. Although the Commission regarded the remarks as sufficiently offensive to warrant license revocation, it declined to take such action and instead simply issued a cease and desist order against further
broadcast announcements' of this kind.
The problem of what action could be taken against such
programming was posed again in Palmetto Broadcasting Company.' $' The Commission, in response to complaints received concerning.programs which were allegedly vulgar and suggestive, requested from the licensee a statement concerning the complaints.
In response to the request, the licensee stated that he was unaware
128. 345 F.2d at 732; see also General Electric Co., 2 P & F RAnio
REG. 2d 1038 (1964); Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 22 P & F RADuo
REG. 1023 (1962).
129. Rigged quiz shows are now proscribed by 47 U.S.C. § 509
(1964).
130. 20 P & F RAnIo REG. 345 (1960).
131. 23 P & F RADIo REG. 483 (1962), aff'd sub noam. Robinson v.
FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
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at the time that such offensive statements were made. Subsequently, the Commission designated the licensee's application
for renewal of its license and for construction of an antenna system for a hearing on the issues, among others, of whether the
licensee had misrepresented facts to the Commission or was
otherwise lacking in candor, whether the programming was
"coarse, vulgar, suggestive and susceptible of indecent, double
meaning," whether the licensee had permitted such program material, and whether, in light of those facts determined on these
issues, the applications should be permitted. The hearing examiner found against the licensee on all of these issues and concluded that it had not, therefore, served the interests of the community. He proposed that the applications be denied. The Commission affirmed the examiner's findings but modified his conclusions of law, holding that the licensee's misrepresentations
and false statements, in and of themselves, constituted grounds
for denial of the applications. On appeal, the court of appeals
affirmed on the narrow grounds that because of the licensee's
concealment of material facts, the Commission was justified in
its conclusion that the licensee did not possess the requisite
character qualifications and was, therefore, justified in refusing
to renew the license.
Subsequently, in Pacifica Foundation,132 the Commission
was again confronted at renewal time with complaints directed at
several programs which were said to be of questionable taste.
This time the Commission refused to take any action, holding
that even if the programs were of questionable taste, they were
isolated instances spread out over a four year period and did
not demonstrate any persistent lapse of taste, and that the programs were not so egregiously offensive as to warrant Commission action.
2. FirstAmendment Implications
In the relatively few cases in which the Commission has
singled out for review or taken direct action against particular
programs, the constitutional implications of the Commission's actions are largely self-evident. Because the restraint exercised
in these cases is directed at particular program content, some
form of censorship is necessarily involved. The issue then becomes simply whether or not, on the particular facts, such censorship is constitutional.
1T2.

1 P &F RADIo REG. 2d 747 (1964).
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While it is not difficult to envision circumstances in which
action of the type reflected in the previously discussed cases
might well be unconstitutional, it is difficult to find any unconstitutionality in the few cases decided to date, although several
recent Commission cases give rise to some concern. Consider
first, for example, the Commission's refusal to renew Dr. Brinkley's broadcast license. On the facts of that case, this action can
scarcely be considered extraordinary or patently unreasonable.
The Commission imposed no greater restraint than could constitutionally have been imposed by other, even more direct means
wholly without regard to Brinkley's use of a radio station. Surely
a law which outlawed unethical medical practice and which was
enforced by means of revocation of a license to practice could not
133
be considered an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech.
The refusal to renew Brinkley's broadcast license seems no more
unconstitutional than the action taken by the state of Kansas in
suspending his medical license for unethical conduct. 134 Surely
the Commission's refusal of a license to Brinkley because of his
fraudulent practices is no more unconstitutional than the actions
of the Food and Drug Administration or the Federal Trade Commission in enforcing provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and other acts which
regulate labeling and other representations of drugs and medical preparations which are of doubtful safety or efficacy. So
far as is known, no one has ever seriously suggested that these
acts constitute an unconstitutional abridgment of free speech.
Unfortunately, in discussions about the Brinkley case today,
attention is focused less on the extraordinary facts which underlie the Commission's actions than on some sweeping and foolish
language in the opinion of the court of appeals in affirming. Despite defensible grounds for affirming the Radio Commission's
actions, the court of appeals reasoned that there was no censorship and no first amendment violation because there had been
no attempt at a prior restraint.
In considering the question whether the public interest, convenience or necessity will be served by renewal of . .. (this]
133. This is not to say, of course, that there may not be constitutional requirements for adherence to certain procedures, e.g., an adjudicatory hearing to be followed in revoking a license.
134. At the time of the proceedings before the Radio Commission,
Brinkley was also before the Kansas State Medical Examination Board
in a proceeding to revoke his medical license for "having acted according to the ethical standards of an imposter" and for "organized charlatanism." Brinkley v. Hassig, 130 Kan. 874, 289 P. 64 (affirming denial
of an injunction against medical board proceedings), appeal dismissed,
282 U.S. 800 (1930).
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license, the commission has merely exercised its undoubted
right to take note of ... past conduct, which is not censorship.'13
needs pointing out that this reasoning would give the
scarcely
It
Commission a constitutional carte blanche to take virtually any
action it chose against station practices, particular types of programming, or particular programs which it deemed not in the
public interest. Fortunately, it is unnecessary to pursue the
parade of evils which might ensue from the court of appeals'
opinion in the Brinkley case since its reasoning was clearly rejected by the Supreme Court's opinion in Near v. Minnesota,136
handed down only a few months after the Brinkley case, which
made it clear that the reach of the first amendment was not confined to restraints imposed prior to the exercise of speech. Thus,
the court of appeals' opinion is of doubtful significance today.
Nevertheless, on its special facts, the Brinkley case should be and
is good law today. The mere fact that the court affirmed on unacceptable grounds should not obscure the fact that this was an
extraordinary case which warranted the drastic action taken.
Essentially the same considerations which justified the Commission's actions against Brinkley hold true of the Shuler case,
although perhaps to a less compelling degree. The restraint imposed by the Commission in this latter case seems not materially
different in kind or effect from restraints imposed by courts in
actions for defamation or for contempt of court. With few exceptions, these latter restraints have been generally accepted as
constitutionally permissible. For example, a civil action for an
injunction or damages against Shuler for his defamatory utterances would probably have been constitutional at the time when
the Commission refused renewal of his license, although some of
probably now be prohis remarks against public officials would
137
tected under the Sullivan case doctrine.
One critic of the decision has concluded that the essential
facts of the Shuler case are indistinguishable from those of Near
v. Minnesota and that the decision is irreconcilable with Near. 3
However, it seems extreme to say that the cases are irreconcilable. Near does not proscribe all attempts to curb defamatory
utterances. It did not say that it could never be constitutional
to refuse to permit a person to operate a communications medium
135.
136.
137.
138.
lemma,

47 F.2d at 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: The Broadcaster's Di32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 719, 758 (1964).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:67

which had repeatedly engaged in defaming persons and obstructing justice. The primary evil of the statute struck down in Near
was its broad and vague scope. It applied not merely to defamatory utterances but to publication of scandalous matter. Moreover, the statute in effect placed the burden of proof on the
newspaper, since it was not necessary to prove the falsity of the
defamatory utterances before a court could enjoin them. While
the facts as reported in the Shuler case do not permit a detailed
comparison of all of the facts and circumstances, these evils do
not appear to have been present in that case. This is not to say,
of course, that Commission actions in this area are not subject to
the same constitutional scrutiny as applied in Near.
The constitutional implications of the Commission's actions
in restraining the use of broadcast facilities for broadcasting lottery and other illegal gambling information are in substance no
different from those raised by the Commission's actions in the
Brinkley case. Once again the action of the Commission is not
essentially different from that of other agencies such as the Post
Office or the Justice departments. So far as is known, no one
has seriously challenged those provisions of the United States
Criminal Code which proscribe the dissemination of lottery information or other information which aids and abets gambling' 39 as
being unconstitutional. The Supreme Court in the American
Broadcastingcase gave no indication that antilottery laws, reasonably construed, pose any serious first mnendment problems. The
same basic considerations apply to restraints against the broadcast
140
of fraudulent contests such as that involved in the KWK case.
In restraining fraudulent or deceptive practices, the Commission
is doing very little more than is done, for example, by the FTC' 4 '
or the Post Office Department 42 or, in a more restricted area,
the SEC14 3 or the FDA, 144 and the constitutionality of these
139. In 1961 Congress made it a crime to use wire communications
facilities for the transmission of wagering information by persons engaged in the business of betting or wagering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1084
(1964).

140. 25 P & F RADIO REG. 577 (1963); see. also, Eleven Ten Broadcasting Corp., 22 P & F RADIO REG. 699 (1962).
141.

15 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53a, 54a (1964); see, e.g., Koch v. FTC, 206

F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953).

142. 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (1964); see, e.g., Donaldson v. Read Magazine,
Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948).
143. See § 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84 (1933),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964); § 15 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1964); SEC
Rule 10b-5, 7 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; 3 L. Loss, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 142330 (2d ed. 1961).
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"antifraud" measures can scarcely be seriously questioned. 145
This is not, however, to suggest that there are no first amendment
problems here. There are surely some outer constitutional limits
on what the Commission can restrain in the name of "fraud."
These limits are suggested by the rigged quiz show scandal
where relatively harmless deception, done for the chief purpose
of enhancing entertainment value, was equated with fraud by
both the Commission' 46 and Congress. 147 This particular problem in defining fraud is unique to Commission regulation since,
outside the field of Commission regulation, civil, criminal, and
regulatory actions against fraud and misrepresentation are confined to cases which have long been accepted as actionable at
common law or at least those in which it is likely to cause ascertainable public harm. The Commission, however, does not need
to look to the traditional definitions of or limitations on actions
for fraud. It can, in its view, always proceed under the allencompassing cloak of "public interest.' 148 It is here that the
real problem lies.
More troublesome than the potentially broad exercise of
power to proscribe "fraud" which is not really fraud is the exercise of power by the Commission to proscribe "offensive" pro149
gramming. The Commission's action in Mile High Stations,
although the result was favorable to the licensee, indicates the
need for concern over the exercise of sweeping powers to proscribe programming which the Commission finds offensive or improper. Mile High Stations did not attract particularly wide attention, probably because the licensee did not contest the constitutional issue but simply pleaded ignorance of the station announcer's offensive remarks. Since the Commission forgave the
licensee this one trespass and terminated the show cause proceed144. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(k), (m) (1964); see, e.g., Kordel v. United
States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948).
145. See Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 189-92
(1948), where the Court affirmed the power of Congress to control
fraudulent practices (here under the postal fraud statutes): "[Tihe
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press [do not] include complete freedom, uncontrollable by Congress, to
use the mails for perpetration of swindling schemes." Id. at 191.
146. See Melody Music, Inc., 6 P & F RADio REG. 2d 973 (1966).
147. See 47 U.S.C. § 509 (1964).
148. It may be that in the narrow area of quiz programs the Commission would be limited by the statutory requirements of § 509 of the
Act. However, § 509 would presumably not be interpreted as a limitation on the Commission's power under the Act to take action in the
"public interest" against other types of "fraud."
149. 20 P & F RADIo REG. 345 (1960).
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ing with a warning, apparently few were concerned with the
action of the Commission which raises a serious question of
whether restraint of the speech in that case was constitutional.
0
The Commission's subsequent action in the Palmetto'"
case
has attracted wider attention. In one sense, however, the action
in Palmetto is less troublesome than the action in Mile High
Stations. The Commission's actions in Palmetto have been criticized as being, in substance, direct censorship of program content
notwithstanding the Commission's unwillingness to rest its decision on the grounds that the program content was vulgar, indecent, and offensive.' 51 While this may be, it is important to note
that on its facts Palmetto is somewhat of an exceptional case in
that there were misrepresentations of material fact which could
be said to bear on the character of the licensee. Clearly the Commission has some latitude in passing on the character of licensees
even though the Commission's findings as to character qualifications may in some instances be connected with or related to
program issues.
This is not to say that the Commission would be constitutionally justified in using character qualifications as a dodge to
evade the constitutional issues which are confronted when particular programming is called into question. 152 For example, it
would clearly be improper and unconstitutional for the Commission to examine a particular program or type of program, decide for itself that the program is bad, and then take action
against the licensee, not on the basis of the particular program,
but on the basis of the licensee's lack of character qualifications
as indicated by the bad programming. Palmetto itself, however,
does not necessarily indicate that the Commission is disposed to
proceed in such a manner, since in Palmetto there were misrepresentations to the Commission as to circumstances surrounding the programming.
The fears raised by the Commission's action in Palmetto
have been at least partly allayed by its subsequent decision in
the Pacifica case.153 Perhaps most significant is the reason given
by the Commission for refusing to take action against the licensee
for broadcasts which had occasioned many public complaints.
150. 23 P & F RADIO REG. 483 (1961), af-d sub nom. Robinson v.
FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
"° 151. Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARV. L.
REv. 701, 712-14 (1964).

152. See Brown, Characterand Candor Requirements for FCC Licensees, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 644, 654-55 (1957).
153. 1 P & F RADo REG. 2d 747 (1964).
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We recognize that, as shown by the complaints here, such
provocative programming as here involved may offend some
listeners. But this does not mean that those offended have the
right, through the Commission's licensing power, to rule such
programming off the airway. Were this the case, only the
wholly inoffensive, the bland, could gain access to the radio
microphone or TV camera. No such drastic curtailment can be
countenanced under the Constitution, the Communications Act,
or the Commission's policy.... 154
Even if Pacifica does not entirely set to rest all fears raised by
Palmetto and Mile High Stations, it does suggest that the Commission intends to proceed cautiously in this area.
While the Commission's authority to impose direct restraints
on obscene, defamatory, or other socially harmful programming
poses significant first amendment problems, the actions of the
Commission to date probably do not warrant grave concern since
they have been fairly circumscribed within the ambit of restraints constitutionally justifiable and permitted for nonregulated communications media.
3. Control of Advertising: A Note in Passing
Until its recent "fairness doctrine" ruling that stations advertising cigarettes must devote time to expression of the view
that smoking is a health hazard, 15 4a the Commission's attempts to
"regulate" the advertising practices, as such, of broadcast stations
had been minimal, limited, and largely ineffectual. Leaving direct supervision and control of deceptive advertising practices to
the Federal Trade Commission, 155 the FCC has traditionally confined its concern almost exclusively to excessive advertising,
with an occasional foray into advertising of certain products 5 6
154. Id. at 750.
154a. Letter to WCBS-TV, 9 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1423, petition for

reconsideration denied, 11 P & F RADio REG. 2d 1901 (1967). See text
accompanying notes 259-63 infra.
155. The Commission has established a "liaison" with the FTC
whereby the latter advises the FCC of "questionable advertising"
broadcast over radio and television stations. Any determination of
deceptive advertising-or perhaps even "questionable" advertising-is
taken into account by the FCC in weighing whether the licensee is
operating "in the public interest." Liaison Between FCC and FTC
Relating to False and Misleading Radio and TV Advertising, P & F
RADIO REG., Current Service vol. 1, at 11:201 (1957); see generally Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005,

1019-27, 1063-1101 (1967).
156. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 2 F.C.C. 76 (1935) (advertising of birth control product). In the case of liquor, the Commission
has confined its activities to approval of the self-regulation standards
of the NAB codes which prohibit advertising hard liquor, NAB, THE
TELEVISION CODE 14 (§ IX, i[ 5) (11th ed. 1966), and impose other re-
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or overly loud commercials. 1 57 With respect to excessive advertising, although the Commission did at one time propose to adopt
fixed rules imposing time limitations similar to those of the NAB
Codes, the proposal was abandoned principally as a result of a
strong congressional opposition. 158 As a result, the Commission's
efforts in this area have been made largely through "scrutiny" at
renewal time 5 9 and the usual panoply of techniques incident to
renewal, including admonitory letters to offending licensees'0 0
and short-term renewals. 1 1
It is difficult to know how to assess, from a first amendment
viewpoint, the Commission's efforts in the field of advertising
controls, since it is doubtful that commercial advertising is
"speech" protected by the first amendment. 1 6 2 While this reflects
a rather circumscribed view of the first amendment, which deserves to receive more critical analysis than it has thus far received, it is beyond the scope of the present article. Even if
commercial advertising were within first amendment protection,
it is doubtful whether those of the Commission's regulatory acstrictions on advertising methods, see Developments in the Law, supra
note 155, at 1155.
157. See Objectionable Loudness of Commercials, 5 P & F RADIO REG.
2d 1621-22 (1965), making certain revisions in regulations to control
loudness and adopting a "Statement of Policy" concerning loud commercials proscribing certain practices in commercial announcements.
158. Commercial Advertising Standards, 1 P & F RADIO REG. 2d
1606 (1964); see also Commercial Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 2
P & F RADIO REG. 2d 885 (1964) (dissent of Chairman Henry). Congressional opposition was manifested, among other ways, in a bill
introduced at the time to strip the Commission of its power to prescribe
rules governing the length and frequency of advertisements. See id.
at 890. Although the Commission in 1964 declined to adopt fixed standards along the lines of those set by the NAB, it recently did announce a
policy of requiring licensees to justify a failure to observe NAB Code
limits on commercial time (18 minutes per hour for radio, 16 minutes
per hour for television). See BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, March 6, 1967,
at 36-37.
159. Overcommercialization has on relatively rare occasions occurred
in the context of initial applications. See, e.g., Michigan Broadcasting
Co., 20 P & F RADIO REG. 667 (1960) (designation for hearing on issues
relating to number and length of commercials); Sheffield Broadcasting
Co., 21 P & F RADIO REG. 507 (1961) (comparative demerit for overcommercialization); Travelers Broadcasting Serv. Corp., 6 F.C.C. 456
(1938) (application for assignment of license denied).
160. See BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, March 6, 1967, at 36-37.
161. Gordon County Broadcasting Co., 24 P & F RADIO REG. 315
(1962); Mississippi Arkansas Broadcasting Co., 22 P & F RADIO REG.
305 (1961).
162. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). For an excellent treatment of the constitutional question, see Developments in
the Law, supra note 155, at 1027-38.
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tions which impose direct restraints on advertising practices
involve any serious encroachment on such first amendment protection as is accorded to advertising. Curbs on overcommercialization and on certain techniques of advertising such as overloudness seem generally justifiable in the context of radio and television to the same extent they are in comparable situations outside
3
the field of radio and television. 1 And, of course, curbs on false
or fraudulent advertising are clearly constitutional under established authority. 6 4 The constitutional implications of the indirect restraints on cigarette advertising imposed by the Commission's recent fairness doctrine decision will be discussed below.
B.

GENERAL PROGRAM REGULATION THROUGH THE LICENSING
PROCESS

1.

GeneralProgramStandards

The Commission's regulation of programming is, of course,
by no means confined to direct proscription of undesirable programs. More often the nature of the FCC's action is indirect,
tending to influence the broadcast of certain programming by
imposition of general standards or through informal oversight of
the licensee's programming policies. While the Commission's actions in the area of direct restraint have been relatively circumspect to date, its indirect influence on program policies evidences
a greater control of program choice and this poses far greater
constitutional problems.
Typically, the Commission attempts to achieve what it euphemistically refers to as "program balance" and "programming
in the public interest." The first comprehensive statement of
Commission policy on programming balance and on the responsibility of broadcasters to program in the public interest was the
Commission's famous Blue Book:
In issuing and in renewing the licenses of broadcast stations the Commission proposes to give particular consideration
to four program service factors relevant to the public interest.
(1) the carrying of sustaining programs, including network
...
sustaining programs, with particular reference to the retention
by licensees of a proper discretion and responsibility for maintaining a well-balanced program structure; (2) the carrying of
local live programs; (3) the carrying of programs devoted to the
discussion of public issues; and (4) the elimination of advertising excesses. 165
163. Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
164. Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178 (1948); Regina
Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 770 (3d Cir. 1963).
165. FCC, PUBLIC SERVICE REsPoNsIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES 55
(1946). For an excellent discussion of the background of the Blue
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Although its policies were invoked in several cases to question
renewal applications not meeting the announced standards,","
the Blue Book, as such, never assumed the permanent substantial importance that it was undoubtedly intended to have.
Today it is all but forgotten as anything more than an historical
source of Commission policy, and is never directly relied on.
However, the basic policies outlined in the Blue Book have
not been abandoned. The same "program service factors" continue to occupy the Commission's attention although the Commission, learning from its experience with the Blue Book, has
attempted to avoid stating its standards in terms of absolute
demands. Basically the same emphasis on "balanced programming," but with somewhat less emphasis on "sustaining" versus
"commercial" programs and the same emphasis on public service
programming are inherent in the Commission's "modern" policy
statement, 167 and in its current practices. Neither its concern
for "local live" programming' 8 nor its concern over excessive
advertising' 1 9 has in any way abated.
Book, see L. WITE, Tnn AMERICAN RADIO 182-99 (Comm'n on Freedom
of the Press ed. 1947); see also 2 Z. CHAFES, GOVERNMENT AND MASS
COMMUNICATIONS 689-94 (Comm'n on Freedom of the Press ed. 1947).

The Blue Book evoked strong condemnation from the broadcast industry. Illustrative is the statement of the Chairman of CBS who
denounced it as "government program-censorship" and "the most direct threat yet made by government to interfere with programming."
Paley, "Radio and Its Critics," Address to NAB, October 22, 1946,
quoted in 2 Z. CHAFEE, supra at 636.
Strong criticism was also voiced from outside the industry, both
on grounds of regulatory wisdom as well as doubtful constitutionality.
See L. WITE, supra at 193-99, 229-30. Without getting into the
question of wisdom, Chafee did not view the Blue Book as posing a
serious first amendment problem. 2 Z. CHAFES, supra at 637-38.
166. The Community Broadcasting Co., 12 F.C.C. 85 (1947); Howard
W. Davis, 12 F.C.C. 91 (1947); Eugene Roth, 12 F.C.C. 102 (1947).
167. Statement of Policy on Programming, 20 P & F RADIO REG.
1901 (1960). On program balance and service, the following oft-quoted
statement is generally the point of departure for the Commission:
The major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest, needs and desires of the community in which the station is located as developed by the industry, and recognized
by the Commission, have included: (1) Opportunity for Local
Self-Expression, (2) The Development and Use of Local Talent,
(3) Programs for Children, (4) Religious Programs, (5) Educational Programs, (6) Public Affairs Programs, (7) Editorializing by Licensees, (8) Political Broadcasts, (9) Agricultural
Programs, (10) News Programs, (11) Weather and Market Re-

ports, (12) Sports Programs, (13) Service to Minority Groups,

(14) Entertainment Programming.
Id. at 1913.
168. See note 175 infra and accompanying text.
169. See notes 155-161 supra and accompanying text.
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Program balance and programming in the public interest
are determined by the Commission principally on the basis of an
analysis of past or proposed programming in terms of categories
established by the Commission as representative of all of the
major different types, and on the basis of an assessment of
whether the programs meet the needs, tastes, and interests of the
station's service area. Of critical significance in the latter regard
is the applicant's efforts to ascertain those needs, tastes, or interests.
Part IV, "Statement of Program Service," of the broadcast
applications required for new stations, major changes in facilities, transfer of control, and assignment or renewal of license, is
the heart of the Commission's direct regulatory oversight of programming. A detailed statement as to the amount and percentage of proposed programming is required and, in cases of renewal
or assignment and transfer, a detailed statement supported by
station program logs showing the past programming in each of
170
the specified program categories is mandatory.
The particular classifications used by the Commission have
long been widely criticized in the industry as being arbitrary,
vague, meaningless, needlessly detailed, and burdensome to the
station. Each station is required (a) to maintain detailed logs
in which each of the programs is carefully recorded in one of the
categories, and (b) to analyze the logs at renewal time to obtain
the information required in the renewal application. Even the
Commission has recognized the validity of the criticism directed
at the arbitrariness and vagueness of the categories. In 1965 it
revised the AM-FM program classifications, and in 1966 it
adopted similar changes for television. 171 The validity of the
other criticisms has not been recognized. Indeed, the new forms
are, if anything, more detailed and more burdensome. The Commission's expanding concern with the nature of the program
service presented and its apparent use of program classification
as a means of influencing stations to provide programming of a
170. The Commission's recently revised programming forms for

AM, FM, and television prescribe the following primary categories of

programming: agricultural, entertainment, news, public affairs, religious, instructional, sports, and others. Three secondary categories are
established: editorials, political programs, and educational institution
programs. Under this revised procedure, a station maintains logs classifying each program into the above categories but is required to show
overall amounts of programming only in the following: news, public
affairs, and all other programs exclusive of entertainment and sports.
171. AM-FM Program Forms, 5 P & F RAmio REG. 2d 1773 (1965);
Television ProgramForms,8 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1512 (1966).
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certain type have, however, raised even more troublesome questions.
While the effort of a broadcast station applicant to seek out
community interests has long been one of the criteria taken into
account in comparative hearings, 172 it did not play a major role
in the Commission's consideration of individual applicants until
the 1961 Suburban Broadcasters decision. 17 3 Since that time,
however, the Commission has given increased attention to the
efforts made by an applicant or licensee to become familiar with
and to demonstrate how its programming will serve the service
area's tastes, needs, and interests. 74 This policy, while theoretically applicable to all programming, has in recent years been
reflected principally as a concern for increased local live programming, especially during "prime time" hours. 75
2.

Licensing New Facilities: Single Applicant

Despite constant protests by the Commission that it is not
concerned with the content of particular programs or that it does
not require a station to broadcast a certain amount of any type
of programming, its actions belie these disclaimers. This is most
clearly indicated in the Commission's practice of pressing all
applicants onto the procrustean bed of "acceptable" program
categories.
A seeming exception to this attitude might be seen in the
fact that the Commission has been willing to allow AM and FM
stations to engage in specialized programming in one or a few of
the standard program categories, on a showing that overall pro172. Under the so-called "planning and preparation" criteria. E.g.,
WHDH, Inc., 13 P & F RADIo REG. 507, 555-59, 576-77 (1957), remanded
on other grounds sub nom. Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC,
261 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
173. 20 P & F RADIo REG. 951 (1961), affd sub nom. Henry v. FCC,

302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962). The decision
was purportedly based on the comprehensive program policy announced a year earlier in its Statement of Policy on Programming,20
P & F RADIo REG. 1901 (1960), which emphasized the preeminent importance of a "diligent, positive and contiauing effort [by the licensee]
to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs and desires of the service area."
. 174. E.g., Washington Broadcasting Co., 5 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 653
(1965) (assignment of license); Chapman Radio & Television Co., 4
P & F RADIo REG. 2d 532 (1965) (application for new facilities); WCSC,
Inc., I P & F RADIo REG. 2d 619 (1964) (dissent to renewal without

hearing).
175. See, e.g., Address by Commissioner Ford, Virginia Association
of Broadcasters, June 20, 1963, reprinted in FCC Release No. 37,118;
Omaha Local Television Programming Inquiry, I P & F RADIo REG. 2d
1901 (1963); WCSC, Inc., 1 P & F RADIo REG: 2d 619 (1964) (dissent).

1967]

THE FCC AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

115

gram balance is provided by complementary program schedules. 17 6 However, the exception only proves the rule. Absent
very special circumstances, the broadcaster who fails to provide a
respectable percentage of programming in the categories which
the Commission has selected as representative of balanced programming in the public interest does so, or, what is substantially
the same, reasonably believes that he does so, at his peril.
The Commission's decision in Lee Roy McCourry 7 7 illustrates this. In McCourry the applicant applied for a license for a
new UHF television station, proposing a specialized programnming
format comprised of seventy per cent entertainment and thirty
per cent educational programs. Based principally 178 on the applicant's failure to offer any special justification for not providing for religious, agricultural, news, discussion, or similar programming, 179 the Commission set the application down for hearing on the issues, inter alia, of whether the applicant had investigated community needs and whether the applicant's specialized format would meet these needs. The immediate effect of
the Commission's action was simply to require McCourry to
justify his programming. However, as noted by the dissent, this
was virtually tantamount to denial of the application in this
case or was, in any event, a heavy sanction for failing to conform
to the Commission's idea of a proper pattern of programming. 8 0
The McCourry case is certainly no cause celebre. Despite a
strong dissent, the case probably cannot be regarded as a significant departure from the Commission's longstanding insistence
on the ascertainment of community needs and on basic conformity to a balanced program format in the context of comparative hearings and renewal proceedings.
3. Licensing New Facilities: The ComparativeHearing
The Commission's procedure for determining which of two
176. See, e.g., Herbert Muschel, 23 P & F RADIo REG. 1059 (1962).
At least a theoretical distinction should be drawn between specialized
programming in this sense and programming oriented towards the special needs of a minority group in the station's service area which may
still be accomplished by adherence to a "balanced" program schedule
with programs in each of the various categories. The Commission has
also approved this type of "special audience" programming. See Voice
of Charlotte Broadcasting, 6 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 355 (1965).
177.

2 P & F RAD o REG. 895 (1964).

178. In addition to the programming issue, issues as to adequacy
of staffing, financial qualifications, and main studio location were involved. Id. at 897.
179.

Id. at 896.

180.

Id. at 901-02.
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or more applicants for the same facility'8 1 is by comparison more
deserving of a broadcast permit has long been held up by critics
18 2
as a classic example of the administrative process at its worst.

Inadequately guided by Commission procedures and standards,
the prodigious efforts by the parties to compile a complete and
comparatively superior record produce little more than staggering records.'8 3
It is not the purpose of this Article, however, to criticize the
comparative hearing process or the comparative criteria. The
concern here is only with those aspects of the comparative hearing process which relate to program regulation and its constitutional implications.
The Commission's focus on an applicant's proposed programming in a comparative hearing is not essentially different from
its examination of the program proposals of a noncomparative
single applicant. The Commission typically evaluates comparative applicants on the basis of their efforts to survey and ascertain community needs and interests and on the basis of a quanti181. The term "comparative hearing" is often used, inaccurately,
to designate all hearings on mutually inconsistent applications. There
are significant differences, however, between the scope of a true comparative hearing involving two or more applicants for the same frequency in the same location and a hearing on mutually inconsistent
applications for stations in different communities which propose the

mutually incompatible use of co-channel or adjacent channel frequencies

-generally referred to as a "307 (b) hearing." The comparative hearing is focused on the so-called "standard comparative issue," a broad
issue encompassing comparisons between applicants on numerous criteria. -See note 187 infra. However, the more limited 307(b) hearing

is focused on a comparison of the service needs of the respective com-

munities and considerations of relative efficiency in the utilization of
frequencies. See, e.g., Bible Institute of Los Angeles, Inc., 24 P & F
RADio REG. 205 (1962). Thus, the 307(b) hearing does not contemplate
a comparison of the respective proposed programming or program-related operations (such as staffing, etc.), although under certain circumstances programming issues may be added. See, e.g., Saul M. Miller,
24 P & F RADio REG. 550 (1962); Granite City Broadcasting Co., 18
P & F RAnio REG. 852 (1959).
1- 182. E.g., W. JONES, LicENsinG Or /AJoR BROADCAST FAcTmIEs By
THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMIsSION,

REPORT TO THE ADMINIs-

TRATIE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CoImnTTEE ON LIcENSES
AND AuTHoazATIONs 198-204 (1962); Friendly, The Federal Adminis-

trative Agencies: The Need For Better Definition of Standards,75 HARv.
L. REv. 1055, 1065-72 (1962); Schwartz, Comparative Television and the
Chancellor's Foot, 47 GEO. L.J. 655 (1959).
183. WHDH, Inc., FCC 66 D-47, at 264 (1966). Some idea of the
magnitude of the hearing in WHDH (resulting from the reopening of a
decision based on earlier hearings held in 1954-1955!) may be gleaned
from the size of the examiner's opinion, 252 pages of which are devoted
to findings of fact alone.
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tative evaluation of each applicant's program balance based on
the respective percentages of time to be devoted the various program types defined by the Commission.18 4 Where the applicants
each show respectable balance in the various categories,1 8 5 the
Commission is quick to deny any judgment of qualitative difference between particular programs.188
It is true, however, that the comparative hearing has a somewhat different impact on program discretion than does the hearing in a noncomparative situation. Unlike the McCourry type of
situation, for example, there is no occasion here for setting an
application for hearing on the basis of insufficient balance or
other assumed defects in proposed programming, since mutually
inconsistent applications must go to hearing anyway. Every application set for a comparative hearing is set for a hearing on the
18 7
standard comparative issue.
184. See, e.g., Central Coast Television, 1 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 237,
247 (1963); Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 24 P & F RADIo REG.
319, 331-32 (1962); Florida Gulfcoast Broadcasters, Inc., 23 P & F RADIO
REG. 1, 8 (1962).

185. E.g., Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 5
P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1901 (1965); Sunbeam Television Corp., 5 P & F
RADIo REG. 2d 85, 87 (1965); Florida Gulfcoast Broadcasters, 23 P & F
RADIO REG. 1, 8 (1962).
186. E.g., Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 24 P & F RADIo REG.
319, 332 (1962). The Commission's eschewing of "qualitative" comparisons is criticized in Irion, FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competing
Applicants, 43 MNmN. L. REy. 479, 492-94 (1959). It is perhaps significant that Irion, one of the most highly regarded FCC hearing examiners, evidently sees no major first amendment problem involved
in the evaluation of the quality of particular programming and program proposals.
187. The "standard comparative issue" is an exceedingly broad
statement of the key issue in comparative hearings (not in "307(b)
hearings"). The formulation of the standard comparative issue is as
follows:
To determine on a comparative basis which of the operations
proposed in the above-entitled applications would best serve the
public interest, convenience, and necessity in light of the
record made with respect to the significant differences between
the applicants as to:
(a) The background and experience of each of the abovenamed applicants having a bearing on its ability to own and
operate the proposed television station.
(b) The proposals of each of the above-named applicants with respect to the management and operation of the
proposed station.
(c) The programming service proposed in each of the
above-entitled applications.
WHDH, Inc., 13 P & F RADIO REG. 507, 515 (1957).
Within this broad formulation, criteria have crystallized which are
supposed to be relevant in deciding among applicants (although many
of these criteria are petty and not conceivably important and several
are mutually contradictory). Prior to the Commission's 1965 Policy
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On the other hand, the Commission may add other issues
directed to specific questionable aspects of a party's application. 88 An applicant proposing what the Commission regards
as questionable program policies may have the application set for
a hearing on the so-called "Suburban issue," theoretically designed to investigate what efforts the applicant has made to
determine and satisfy the needs and interests of its proposed service area. Although the standard comparative issue substantially includes this investigation, the significance of the additional "Suburban issue" is that it is a potentially disqualifying
issue unrelated to the comparative merits of the applicants. If
one applicant buys out or merges with competing applicants, the
standard comparative issue becomes moot, but the disqualifying
issue does not. 8 9 In such a case, the Commission will insist on
investigating whether the remaining applicant has met its burden
on the disqualifying issues.
4. Renewal of License: In Terrorem Control
The discussion above focused on the method by which the
Commission controls programming by setting standards to which
a broadcast applicant must conform if he is to succeed in obtaining a license. The process of license renewal every three years
adds a new dimension to this control. The renewal process is
the primary tool used by the Commission to enforce continuing
compliance with the demands initially made on an applicant.
Without this instrument it would be difficult if not impossible
to effect any real control of programming operations. If a licensee fails to adhere to the standards of its promised performStatement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, the accepted criteria
were: (1) local residence; (2) civic participation; (3) diversification
of occupations of principals; (4) experience; (5) integration of ownership with management; (6) past broadcast record; (7) planning and
preparation; (8) program policies; (9) program proposals; (10) studio
and equipment; (11) staff; (12) diversification of ownership of mass
communications media. WHDH, Inc., supra at 566-85. See generally,
Irion, FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competing Applicants, 43 TMnN. L.
REv. 479 (1959). The 1965 Policy Statement retains most of these criteria but purports to establish some degree of priority among them and
explain their proper implementation. Whether the 1965 Policy Statement has really clarified or resolved the contradictions and erased any
of the nonsense that has characterized the interpretation and implementation of these criteria remains to be seen.
188. These may be added on the Commission's own motion or by
motion of the parties to enlarge issues. See, e.g., Springfield Telecasting Co., 3 P &F RADIo REG. 2d 727 (1964).
189. See, e.g., Tri-Cities Broadcasting Co., 6 P & F RADIo REr. 2d
1, 2 (1965).
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ance, the Commission may, of course, revoke the license. Such
a procedure is, however, too cumbersome to be practical. A license revocation proceeding entails initiation by the Commission
of a formal hearing in which the Commission must bear the
burden of proof of noncompliance with the law or unsatisfactory
performance by the licensee. 90 The procedural burdens of a
revocation proceeding would impede and deter Commission enforcement, and would eliminate any real in terrorem effect from
the threat of revocation.
The effectiveness of the renewal process in influencing a licensee's operations, including his program operations, arises from
two facts. First, the licensee has the burden of coming forth, in
a formal application, to show compliance with Commission standards and fulfillment of prior promises; 191 second, this process is
routine and relatively frequent, thereby eliminating any doubt
that the Commission will scrutinize the actual performance of the
station in relation to the performance promised.
The manner in which the renewal process is carried out by
the Commission makes it far more than merely a periodic inspection. Rather the renewal process has become the primary
method through which the Commission exercises day-by-day
control over virtually all broadcast operations, and particularly
over program practices and program operations. Thus, the fact
that the licensee must go through the trial and prove himself
every three years is in a very real sense a "Sword of Damocles"
over the broadcaster's head. If the sword does not often fall,
neither is it ever lifted and the in terrorem effect of the sword's
presence enables the Commission to exercise far-reaching powers
of control over the licensee's operations.
It is this in terrorem aspect of periodic renewal which one
former FCC Commissioner labeled "regulation by the lifted eyebrow,"'192 a label which has since gained considerable currency
in the field of administrative regulation. A letter to the station
from the Commission or even a telephone call to the station's
Washington attorney from the Commission's staff indicating the
Commission's "concern" over a particular practice of the licensee
and asking for the licensee's justification will generally be all
190. See 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312(c)
(1964).
191. In the event the application is set down for hearing, the
licensee has the burden of proof. E.g., Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
192. Commissioner Doerfer dissenting in Miami Broadcasting Co.
(WQAM), 14 P &F RADIo REG. 125, 128 (1956).
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that is necessary to bring the licensee around to the Commission's
way of thinking. If not cultivated, the technique is at least used
to great advantage by the Commission, which almost invariably
makes a point of informing the licensee that its inquiry and the
licensee's response will be associated with the licensee's file and
given "due consideration" upon his next application for renewal.
If a Commission inquiry or expression of concern over a licensee's practices can be expected to have an influential effect
on the licensee, the effect is even greater when the Commission
makes such inquiry at renewal time or notifies the licensee that
it is deferring action on pending renewal applications until it
has received answers to its questions. An example is the Commission's action in Local Live Programming of Television Stations193 where the Commission sent letters to five stations deferring renewal applications because of an inadequate showing of
local live programming in prime time and requesting information
as to local live programming presentations and plans and efforts
to ascertain community needs. In spite of the Commission's request for further information, it is extremely doubtful whether
the Commission really expected to receive any information which
would add meaningfully to what the licensee had already reported. What the Commission seeks in such cases is not information but assurance that future operations will conform to Commission standards; and it would be incredible if the experienced
broadcaster or his Washington counsel would mistake the Commission's handwriting on the wall.194
For the more recalcitrant, there are stronger methods short
of revocation. One is the frequently employed short-term re25 P & F RADIO REG. 482 (1963).
194. Cf. Pierson, The Need for Modification of Section 326, 18 FED.
193.

Com. B.J. 15, 19-20 (1963):

The lawyer [advising his client as -to type of program) has a
number of guides. First, in his day-to-day dealings with the
Commission and its staff, he learns of their attitudes toward
various kinds of proposals. He knows that certain program
proposals are accepted and favorably processed with alacrity.
Other. program proposals create problems not only of getting
expeditous actin but of getting favorable action. On occasion
his client is almost directly threatened with costly litigation
unless program proposals are changed. In addition, Commission decisions, statements of policy and the public statements
of its members afford insight into Commission attitudes toward various types of programming. With these as guides, the
lawyer can quite unerringly outline to his client the programs
that the Commission favors and disfavors ....
To deny that
this constraint exists is to indulge pure myth. To say that
...an applicant proposes or 'promises' programs on the basis
of his independent judgment of the needs and wants of his area
compounds the myth.
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newal (generally for one year) during which time the licensee

is made aware that he is "on probation."'195
The practice of informal control over or influence on individual licensee practices is also followed on an industry-wide
basis through statements of Commission concern over particular
practices or announcements of proposed action. 96 This is enhanced by speeches of individual commissioners. Former Chair197
man Mlinow's famous "Wasteland Speech" is a classic example.
However, less sweeping and dramatic speeches in which some
comment is made on program policies have become almost a
matter of routine. While some of these speeches are inconsequential, there can be no doubt that many are valuable as a
source of at least one commissioner's thinking on a given subject.
5.

FirstAmendment Implications

The Commission's insistence on the licensee's presenting
"balanced" programming, although done in the name of promoting diversity, has had largely the opposite effect. Notwithstanding repeated criticism by various commissioners of the undeniable sameness of programming among broadcasters, the
Commission's own policies do little to encourage diversity or
originality either in the style or content of individual programs
or in the overall format of a station's program operations. Indeed, its policies have, if anything, added to the inherent tendency of broadcasters to conform to safe, established patterns of
operation and programming.
Insistence by the Commission that the licensee maintain respectable percentages of its total programming in the various
program categories is one example of such a policy. Adherence
to these categories by the licensee does not necessarily fix the
content of specific programs within each category. The un195. See, e.g., Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 5 P & F RADIo REG. 2d
205 (1965) (one year renewal because of questionable "fairness" in
presenting views on controversial public issues); Loyola Univ., 24
P & F RADIo REG. 766 (1962) (one year renewal because of significant
deviations from previous program promises).
196. See, e.g., 6 TELEvIsioN DIGEST 2-3 (1966) (press report that
staff "reportedly" urges Commission to send letters to ten AM stations
inquiring as to their failure to carry political broadcasts); 6 TELEWiSION DIGEST 2 (1966) (report of staff proposing to send letters to
nineteen AM stations which proposed to devote less than 5% of their
time to "public affairs" and "other," i.e., agricultural, religious, and
similar nonentertainment categories programming).
197. Address to the 39th Annual Convention of the National Association of Broadcasters, May 9, 1961.
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mistakable result of prescribing categories in which all licensees
are expected to present some programming is, however, sameness of program formats among licensees. Following the Commission's guidelines, for example, each station will generally present a religious discussion program or coverage of a church service at least one Sunday a month; a regularly scheduled farm
news or discussion program, no matter how urban the area; and,
to satisfy the ambiguous category of "talks," a "homemaker"
show at least once a week. There emerges a pattern of sameness
in conformity with safe and acceptable standards bearing the
FCC seal of approval. While the licensee may decide the particular content of programs within each accepted category, he must
maintain a balance among the accepted categories. He deviates
at his peril as is illustrated by the McCourry' 98 case where the
applicant was required to justify, in a formal hearing, his deviation from the Commission's standard of "balance" because of his
failure to conform to the pattern of programming in each of the
accepted categories.
Commissioner Cox, one of the most vigorous and articulate
defenders of the Commission's programming policy, has attempted to justify the Commission's action in McCourry on the
ground that the Commission has the cesponsibility to ensure that
licensees ascertain and serve the needs and interests of their service areas, and the failure of the applicant in McCourry to
justify its failure to show "balanced" programming fully warranted and indeed required the Commission to hold a hearing to
determine whether the applicant would serve the public interest. 199 This simply begs the question.
Even under the most expansive interpretation of the first
amendment, the Commission is not forbidden to insist that an
applicant show that it has made an effort to ascertain the general needs and interests of the community to be served and that
its operations will serve those needs and interests. Moreover, it
does not seem either unconstitutional or unreasonable for the
Commission to require that, in attempting to ascertain and serve
the needs of the community, the licensee must apply his own
judgment, not that of the network or some other program supplier. Simmons v. FCC200 illustrates this problem. There the
Commission denied an application on. the ground that a proposal
198. 2 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 895 (1964).
199. Cox, The FCC, the Constitution and Religious Broadcast Programming, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 196, 207 (1965).
200. 169 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1948); cf. Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC,
160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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to broadcast the complete, unaltered CBS network schedule
would be an abdication of licensee responsibility and would not
affirming, the court held that there.
serve the public interest. In
20
was no censorship involved. 1
But it is one thing to require an applicant or licensee to demonstrate that it has made, by itself, a good faith, reasonable effort to ascertain and serve the needs of the public; it is quite
another for the Commission to set forth a catalogue of the types
of programs which it considers the public interest to require, and
then to require that an applicant or licensee conform its programming to these standards unless it can offer compelling reasons for a varying format. Notwithstanding the fact that this
action was purported to be merely an inquiry into whether
McCourry had really investigated the needs of his prospective
service area and whether his programming would serve those
needs, no one familiar with FCC practice could doubt that the
action was intended to influence McCourry-and other future
applicants who could be counted on to take due note of the Commission's actions-to modify the program format to conform
with the Commission's concept of balanced programming.
That the threat of an agency hearing is in itself, regardless
of potential outcome, an effective method of imposing program
standards is even more persuasively demonstrated in cases involving applications for renewal of existing licenses. The threat
of a hearing on renewal is virtually certain to induce the licensee to conform to the established standards of balanced programming, except in those cases where, for good cause shown,
the Commission has approved specialized programming.
The conformity principle can also be seen at work in the
comparative hearing process. Here, however, the effect of an
evaluation of the applicants' respective program proposals is not
immediately apparent. Although the program proposals, formats,
and policies of the applicants are among the criteria for choosing
between them, the Commission never gives express decisional
importance to the superiority of one applicant's program proposals, even in "quantitative" terms. Indeed, it is unusual to
find a decision in which the Commission even awards a preference to one applicant in the area of programming. Generally,
any preferences granted in the area of programming are expressed as preferences for a superior showing as to an applicant's
efforts to survey and ascertain community needs. On the basis
201.

169 F.2d at 672.
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of the Commission's decisions, then, it might appear that there is
no problem of restraint, since the Commission purports to give
so little attention to a comparative evaluation of programming
proposals. But appearances are deceptive, as are the Commission's published decisions.
In many, if not most cases, no preference could be granted
on the basis of program proposals since there is no discernible
difference of substance between them. This sameness is largely
attributable to similar network program fare, particularly where
both propose an affiliation with the same network. To some extent, sameness of programming is also attributable to the fact
that radio and television stations, like other commercial enterprises, generally strive to meet the widest possible market. To
a significant degree, however, the sameness is also attributable
to the Commission's own efforts to supervise programming operations. The trend to conformity and sameness is inherent in the
Commission's insistence on adherence to "balance," defined as
devoting respectable percentages of program time to each of the
categories prescribed by the Commission. The trend to conformity and sameness is particularly encouraged by the comparative
hearing process itself.202
It takes relatively little imagination on the part of an applicant competing for a license to realize that he must develop a
format of balanced programming which will pass muster under
the Commission's examination. It takes even less imagination,
talent, or creativity to put such a format into effect. It is small
wonder then that most applicants, with the help of Washington
counsel, develop program proposals which will pass the balance
test and which will compare, neither more nor less favorably,
with any other applicant's balanced proposals.20 3

The Commis-

sion encourages this practice. If some applicant gets carried
away with the idea of something special in the way of programhis proposals as imming, the Commission is likely to discount
20 4

practical and unlikely to be effectuated.

In defense of the Commission's use of program types, Commissioner Cox has suggested that the program categories are
not the Commission's creation but that they reflect the basic
program interests of the public, as reported by broadcasters be202. See Pierson, The Need for Modification of Section 326, 18 FED.
CoM. B.J. 15, 19-21 (1963).

203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Veterans Broadcasting Co., 4 P & F RADIo REG. 2d
375 (1965).
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fore the time when such categories were established. According
to this argument, the categories were developed simply for convenience to broadcasters in reporting the programming which
they presented and for ease of processing applications by the
Commission. 20 5 The thrust of this argument is that the use of

specified program categories is simply a convenient method of
getting information.
It may be that the mere requirement that a licensee report
his programming in the various categories, as an incident to
recordkeeping activities by the Commission does not raise any
significant first amendment problem. But Commissioner Cox's
suggestion that the licensee's report of programming is purely a
recordkeeping exercise seems to be less than a candid explanation
of the purpose of the report and the use to which it is put, and as
the Supreme Court has on more than one occasion emphasized,
the fact that an inquiry can be justified as merely routine cannot
be accepted as a cloak which shields such activity from constitutional objection if the character of the inquiry, or the manner and
circumstances in which it is done, aecomplish a restraint on free
speech.

208

Perhaps more basically troublesome than the encouragement
of conformity is the fact that it is impossible to tell whether the
Commission is in fact making value judgments about programming while its published opinions deny that it is doing so. One
can scarcely accept the gratuitous and self-serving statements
made by the Commission in its opinions that it has not recognized
or given any decisive significance to any difference between program proposals. Since the Commission is not wholly oblivious
to the constitutional implications of the close supervision of programming, it is not surprising that the opinions, written to be
as "appeal-proof' as possible, attempt to show an abundance of
caution and restraint in this area.
It is sometimes suggested that, whatever the constitutional
limits on direct program regulation or even on indirect program
influence, the Commission has full constitutional authority to
consider and pass judgment on the programming of two or more
applicants in a comparative hearing, as a basis for choosing between them. Such a distinction between comparative program
205. Cox, supra note 199, at 199-201.
206. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Bates v.
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958); cf. Brown, Characterand Candor Requirements for FCC Licensees, 22 LAw & CoNTmVp. PROB. 644, 654-55 (1957).
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evaluation and other forms of program regulation is suggested
by two of the leading cases on FCC regulatory authority in the
field of programming, Bay State Beacon, Inc. v. FCC20 7 and
Johnston Broadcasting Company v. FCC.20 8 In Bay State the
court held it was not a violation of the first amendment or section
326209 for the Commission to consider, as a factor in selecting
one comparative applicant over another, a quantitative analysis
of the amount of time to be devoted- by the respective applicants
to commercial vis-a-vis noncommercial programs. The court
reasoned that the program analysis merely indicated how the
applicant would perform in the public interest and that, if the
Commission could not make such an inquiry as to programming,
it would be unable to perform its duty to ensure that the public
interest, convenience, and necessity were being served. The court
went on to state that if denial of a license to the unsuccessful
applicant on the basis of inferior program proposals violated the
first amendment, "then every unsuccessful applicant would have
the right of free speech throttled and abridged.' 210 In Johnston
the court again approved the Commission's preference for one
comparative applicant over another on the basis of program
proposals. The court reasoned
It is true that the Commission cannot choose on the basis of
political, economic or social views of an applicant. But in a
comparative consideration, it is well recognized that comparative service to the listening public, is the vital element and
programs are the essence of that service. So, while the Commission cannot prescribe any type of program (except for prohibition against obscenity, profanity, etc.), it can make a comparison 2on
the basis of public interest and, therefore, of public
11
service.

Insofar as the courts in Bay State and Johnston intended
to distinguish between evaluation of programming in the context
of comparative hearings and other forms of direct or indirect
program supervision by the Commission, the reasoning is something less than clear. Implicit in the suggested distinction is
the assumption that because there, must be some basis for selection between applicants it is proper, indeed necessary, to weigh
the comparative merits of the applicant's respective program
proposals.
As to any supposed necessity for choosing between applicants on the basis of program proposals, it is sufficient first to
207. 171 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
208.
209.
210.
211.

175 F.2d 351 (D:C. Cir. 1949).
47 U.S.C. § 326 (1948).
171 F.2d 826, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
175 F.2d 351, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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note the numerous other bases for comparative evaluation which
in no way involve judgments as to programming. There is
scarcely any inherent necessity in basing a selection on an evaluation of program proposals. Second, the convenience or even
necessity of evaluating program proposals to fulfill the statutory
mandate of effecting the public interest, convenience, and necessity can scarcely warrant an intrusion into constitutionally prohibited areas. In the final analysis there is no basis whatsoever
for singling out the comparative hearing process as some special
justification for control of program choice. The Commission's
program regulation policies are just as questionable in this area
as in a noncomparative hearing context.
The ultimate ostensible aim of the Commission's emphasis
on program balance and its general insistence on programming
in all of the key program categories is the advancement of
diversity of viewpoints, ideas, and entertainment. This same
general aim is the underlying rationale for regulation of more
direct impact and more far-reaching implications: regulation
of the broadcasting of political and controversial public issues.
It is here that the constitutional problems of the Commission's
program regulation are brought most sharply into focus.
C.

REGULATION OF POLITICAL BROADCASTS AND CONTROVERSIAL
PUBLIC ISSUES PROGRANMMNG

Few areas of broadcast regulation have been as controversial
as the regulation of political broadcasts and controversial public
issues programming. Acting under the equal time requirements
of section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 and pursuant
to its so-called "fairness doctrine," the Commission has come under increasingly heavy criticism from the industry, Congress,
and even some of its own members because of its interference
with broadcasters' discretion and responsibility in this area of
programming. 2 12 Although political broadcasts and controversial public issues programming may appear in many respects to
pose but a single regulatory problem, they in fact pose two
distinct, though related, problems with distinct, and somewhat
different, constitutional implications.
212. See, e.g., Hearings on Equal Time Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 29 (1963); Hearings on Political Broadcasting before the
Communications Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); see also Dean, Political Broadcasting: The Communications Act of 1934 Reviewed, 20 FED.
COM. B.J. 16, 38-43 (1966).
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1. Equal Time
Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 provides:
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting
station ....

(b) The charges made for the use of any broadcasting
station for any of the purposes set forth in this section shall
not exceed the charges made for comparable use of such station for other purposes.
(c) The Commission shall prescribe appropriate 213
rules and
regulations to carry out the provisions of this section.
An exception from the equal time requirement is provided
for appearances by candidates on bona fide news, interview, or
documentary programs, so long as the licensee continues "to
operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
214
importance.
The concept of equal time in itself is essentially a simple
one, and in most cases its requirements are relatively clear and
direct.2 15 The Commission's key rulings on the principal problems of scope and interpretation are summarized in its Equal
2 17
Time Primer216 and have been quite fully explored by others.
It is, therefore, sufficient here merely to sketch the outline of
the equal time requirements. The equal time requirements are
much more limited than is popularly supposed. First of all, the
duty to provide equal opportunity arises only when a legally
qualified, 218 bona fide candidate himself 219 makes an appearance
on the station either live or on tape for any purpose 220 except
213. 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
214. 48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (4) (1964).
215. Those problems of construction which have been raised in the
application of equal time can be generally summarized under the
following questions: (1) who are legally qualified candidates?; (2)
what constitutes "equal" opportunity?; (3) what constitutes a "use" by
a political candidate?; and (4) what is a bona fide "newscast," "news
interview," "news documentary," or "news events"?
216.

Political Broadcasts, 24 P & F RADIO REG. 1901 (1962)

(in-

corporating earlier summaries).
217. E.g., Friedenthal & Medalie, The Impact of Federal Regulation
on Political Broadcasting: Section 315 of the Communications Act, 72
HARv. L. REv. 445 (1959); Comment, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 63 (1961).
218. See Political Broadcasts, 24 P & F RADio REG. 1901, 1913-15
(1962).

219. Equal time is not required where another person appears on
behalf of the candidate. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio, 186 F.2d 1 (3d
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951).
220. The Commission has ruled in numerous instances that a candi-
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an appearance in connection with a news program or interview.221 There is no specific obligation on the station to carry
political broadcasts in the first instance, although a refusal to
carry any political broadcasting may be considered against the
licensee at renewal time when the Commission decides whether
the station has been operated in the public interest. 222 In addition, the station is not required to seek out the opposing candidates. The initiative is on the opposing candidate to request
224
equal time22 3 within one week of the broadcast.
225
Enforcement of section 315 generally arises on complaint
to the Commission by a candidate who has been denied equal
time. The licensee is notified of the complaint and given time
to reply. Once an order is issued, the order can be enforced
through the usual means of fines, cease and desist orders, and
even denial of license renewal or license revocation for willful
and repeated violations. 226 However, the issuance of a ruling
that a candidate is entitled to equal time has apparently sufficed
in all or virtually all cases. No case has been found in which
any formal sanctions were invoked. The reason for this is obvious since compliance, or attempted compliance in good faith
with a prior ruling is all that is required. Since judicial review
can be had from the informal ruling, 227 a refusal to comply in
order to test the correctness or the constitutionality of the ruling
is unnecessary. In any event, the sanctions risked by noncom-

date who appears for any purpose or in any capacity, even in that of a
station announcer, is a use by the candidate requiring equal time. See
PoliticalBroadcasts, 24 P & F RADio REG. 1901, 1908-12 (1962). But see
Brigham v. FCC, 276 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1960), where the Fifth Circuit
held that a station weatherman's appearance on a program to present
the weather report was not a use although the weatherman was also a
candidate. This may be rationalized, however, on the exemption for
bona fide news broadcasts rather than any exemption for candidates
who make appearances for nonpolitical purposes.
221. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964); see Political Broadcasts, 24 P & F
RADIo REG. 1901, 1908-13 (1962).

222. Licensee's Obligation to Carry Political Broadcasts, 25 P & F
RADIo REG. 1731 (1963).
223. "Equivalent" time means equivalent in terms of rates charged
(or absence of rates), length of time, desirability of the time spot
offered, and any other conditions of use. See Political Broadcasts, 24
P & F RADIO REG. 1901, 1919-21 (1962).
224. 47 C.F.R. § 13.657 (e) (Supp. 1966).

225. The Commission does, when asked, also render declaratory
decisions without any complaint. E.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
3 P &F RADIo REG. 2d 623 (1964).
226. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(d), 312(a) & (b), 504(b) (1964).
227.

See Felbi v. Westinghouse Radio, 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950),

cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951).
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pliance are quite evidently regarded as more important to the
broadcaster than his right not to accord equal time.
Notwithstanding the fact that section 315 is quite limited,
not only as to the period in which it is operative but also as to
the scope of the obligation imposed, the equal time requirements
have been the subject of unrelenting criticism over the years,
and a number of attempts have been made to modify or repeal
section 315.228 Probably the most severe attacks have been
aimed at the Commission's interpretation of section 315, which
has generally tended to expand the scope of the section. The
classic example is the Commission's Lar Daly 22 9 decision, holding
that the appearance of an incumbent political candidate on a
newscast and a separate announcement on behalf of the March
of Dimes constituted a "use& entitling all other candidates to
equal time. This remarkably obtuse decision called forth a flood
of criticism which was quickly followed by congressional reversal
of the decision, and the present exemptions for bona fide news
events.
Despite this swift reversal the Commission has continued to
adhere to an extremely broad interpretation of the word "use."
Thus it insists that any appearance by a candidate for any purpose whatsoever, other than in connection with a bona fide news
program, constitutes a use irrespective of whether the appearance
has any bearing on his political candidacy. 230 This interpretation is based on the rather tenuous theory that any exposure of a
candidate over radio or television ultimately accrues to the candidate's benefit or that, in any event, the licensee should not be
permitted to judge whether the candidate has benefited from the
appearance. 231 Consistent with their expansive reading of section 315, the Commission has also placed some rather narrow
interpretations on the news exemption established by Congress
in 1959 with respect to such appearances as press conferences
228. See, e.g., S. 1010, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. 1696, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). For criticism before Congress of § 315, see
Hearings on Equal Time before the Subcomm. on Communications of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 29 (1963).
The critics of § 315 include at least one former Commissioner. See
Hearings' on Political Broadcasting before the Communications Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1959) (testimony of Commissioner Ford).
229. CBS, Inc., 18 P & F RADIo REG. 701 (1959). For industry
criticisms of the Lar Daly case, see Hearings on Political Broadcasting
Before the Communications Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., is; Sess. (1959).
230. See note 219 supra.
231. See WVICA, Inc., 7 P & F RADIo REG. 1132 (1952).
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and reports from Congressmen. 232 These limited interpretations have justifiably invoked criticism from members of the
233
Commission as well as the industry.
While the Commission has been severely criticized on many
occasions for its interpretation of section 315, probably as much
criticism has been levied at the statutory requirements themselves. This criticism has centered chiefly on the problem of
giving equal time to minority candidates. Although Congress
suspended section 315 for presidential and vice-presidential candidates in 1960,234 every attempt thus far to modify or repeal
section 315 permanently 235 has failed. An attempt to suspend
section 315 again for presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 1964 election campaign failed despite some strong
support for following the 1960 pattern.
2.

The FairnessDoctrine

Closely akin to, but distinct from the equal time requirements is the Commission's so-called "fairness doctrine." Stated
most generally, the fairness doctrine is an obligation imposed on
the broadcaster to present contrasting responsible points of view
on controversial issues of public importance. 236
The history of the fairness doctrine is rather uncertain since
it depends on how one defines what now passes for a doctrine.
The Commission maintains that the fairness doctrine has, in
essence, been in effect from the first days of regulation by the
Federal Radio Commission. 237 A statement in the 1929 Annual
232. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 3 P & F RAuio

REG.

2d

623 (1964); Letter to Congressman Thompson, 23 P & F RADIo REG.

178 (1962).
233. See, e.g., dissenting opinions of Commissioners Ford and Loevinger in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 3 P & F RADio REG. 2d 623, 63031 (1964).
234. Act of Aug. 24, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-677, 74 Stat. 554.
235. See, e.g., S. 252; S. 1696; Hearings on Equal Time Before the

Communications Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 29 (1963).
236. Fairness Doctrine, 2 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1901, 1904 (1964).
For extensive comments on the fairness doctrine reflecting different
attitudes toward it, see Barron, The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 1
(1961); Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: The Broadcaster's Dilemma, 32 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 719 (1964).
237. See FairnessDoctrine, 2 P & F RADio REG. 2d 1901, 1903 (1964).

The Commission also interprets § 315, as amended in 1959, to give statutory sanction for the doctrine. See id. But this seems a somewhat
dubious interpretation of congressional intent. See text accompanying
notes 250-51 infra.
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Report of the Federal Radio Commission does suggest an early
origin of the doctrine:
It would not be fair, indeed, it would not be good service
to the public, to allow a one-sided presentation of political issues of a campaign. Insofar as the program consists of discussion of public questions, public interest requires ample play
for the fair and free competition of opposing views, and the
Commission believes that the principle applies not only to addresses of political candidates
but to discussion of issues of
238
importance to the public.

While a general obligation to be fair in presenting opposing
viewpoints on controversial issues may be inherent in the broadcaster's duty to serve the public interest, there is an important
difference between a general moral responsibility-enforceable,
if at all, only by self-regulation-and a specific legal requirement enforceable by Commission sanction. 239 Despite the Commission's early insistence that the broadcaster is obligated to
present all sides of a controversial issue, it was really not until
240
the Commission's opinion in Mayflower BroadcastingCompany
in 1940, which imposed a ban on broadcast editorializing as inherently unfair, that the Commission articulated something like
the fairness doctrine, enforceable by direct sanction or specific
admonishment, as it is now understood. 241 The Mayflower decision represents a crude first attempt on the part of the Commission to enforce fairness in the treatment of controversial
issues by broadcasters. The case did not, however, lay down any
specific requirements other than the negative commandment:
thou shalt not be an advocate. Apart from condemning editor238. 1929 FRC ANN. REP. 33.
239. Sullivan, supra note 236, at 728.
240. 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).
241. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 10 P & F RADIO REG. 2d
2001, 2011 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court attempts to give an earlier genesis
for the fairness doctrine by finding it in such cases as Shuler and Brinkley. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d
850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931). However, the denial of licenses in these cases was based on a far more flagrant conduct than simple failure to present both sides of a public controversy and neither was grounded on any articulated fairness doctrine
as that term is understood today. So also the Commission's refusal to
license the applicant in Young People's Ass'n for the Propogation of the
Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938), which announced its intention to pursue a
flat, general policy of not permitting use of its facilities for presenting
any view differing from that of the applicant, bears but slight resemblance to the fairness doctrine today but 5s more akin to the Brinkley
and Shuler cases and the principle that a licensee cannot operate the
station in its purely private interests to the exclusion of any public
interest.
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ializing, it spoke only in very sweeping and general terms:
Freedom of speech on the radio must be broad enough to
provide full and equal opportunity for the presentation to the
public of all sides of public issues. Indeed, as one licensed to
operate in a public domain, the licensee has assumed the obpublic questions,
ligation of presenting all sides of important
242
fairly, objectively and without bias.

The scope of the licensee's obligation to ensure the fair presentation of all sides of controversial issues and the manner in which
the Commission intended to enforce that obligation remained as
vague as the broadcaster's duty to serve the public interest.
Few stations were hurt by the ban on editorializing, since the
practice was not widespread in the industry and was generally
frowned upon. 243 Thus, the Mayflower opinion did not evoke
as overwhelming a protest from the industry as might have been
expected.
Apart from the flat ban on editorializing, little effort was
made by the Commission to clarify the scope of the licensee's
obligation to be fair or to set forth any guidelines as to what
would be deemed controversial or what was required in order
to be fair. In fact, the Commission quite evidently did not really
know what fairness meant. Thus, in 1946 it decided not to require a station to give an atheist opportunity to "give the other
side" of views reflected in the station's religious programs, while
at the same time instructing the station to be fair in presenting
religious issues even though this would require the station to
permit expression of highly unpopular minority views including
those of atheists.244 The confusingly vague scope of the fairness
obligation was compounded by the fact that the Commission had,
in 1945, issued a statement of policy to the effect that stations
could not avoid the problem by refusing to carry programs deal245
ing with controversial public issues.
In 1947 the Commission, prompted by the evident need to
clarify the fairness obligation with respect to controversial public issues generally, instituted hearings on the relationships between editorializing and a broadcaster's obligations under the
Act. These culminated in the Commission's Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,248 released in 1949, in which the
Commission reversed Mayflower and reestablished the right of
the broadcaster to editorialize. In addition, this report dealt
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1940).
Sullivan, supra note 236, at 730-32.
Robert Harold Scott, 3 P & F RADIo REG. 259 (1946).
United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945).
1 P & F RADiO REG. 91:201 (1949).
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generally with the licensee's overall duty of fairness in treating
controversial issues. It set forth the licensee's twofold obligation: first, to speak out on controversial public issues, although
not necessarily in the format of station editorials; and, second,
an affirmative obligation to ascertain and seek out all responsible
viewpoints on controversial issues and to afford the opportunity
for such contrasting viewpoints to be heard. 247 It is this twofold obligation which constitutes the modern fairness doctrine.
The 1949 Editorializing Report remains the basic expression
of policy for the fairness doctrine. Congress recognized the fairness doctrine in its 1959 amendments. to section 315. Amended
section 315, after establishing the exemption for bona fide news
broadcasts, provides:
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving
broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts,
news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage
of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under
this chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford
reasonable opportunity for the248discussion of conflicting views
on issues of public importance.

Although the Commission has read the above provision as a ratification of the fairness doctrine, it seems doubtful that Congress,
in amending section 315, actually intended to give specific statutory sanction to the Commission's fairness doctrine. More probably, Congress intended neither approval nor disapproval of it,
but merely intended to ensure that section 315 would not interfere with it. There was no other consideration of the fairness
doctrine as such and no consideration was given to the statutory
2 49
authority for the doctrine as then applied.
In recent years the Commission has attempted to furnish
some more specific guidance in its Fairness Primer, a collection
of ad hoc rulings implementing the fairness doctrine. 250 The
Commission's ad hoc rulings are at best an uncertain guideline.
In order to set forth the basic theory of the fairness doctrine and
to distinguish it from section 315, a few generalizations may be
made.
Unlike section 315, the fairness doctrine does not necessarily
require a station to grant equal time to all opposing viewpoints.
A ten-minute commentary by the station on one side of a con247.

Id. at 91:206.

48 Stat. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)4 (1964).
For a brief discussion of the question see Dean, PoliticalBroadcasting: The Communications Act of 1934 Reviewed, 20 FED. COMm.
248.
249.

B.J. 16, 29-31 (1966).

250. FairnessDoctrine,2 P & F RADIo

REG.

2d 1901 (1964).
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troversial school bond issue, for example, does not necessarily
require that the station grant ten minutes to all other sides.
This flows from the fact that the obligation is to ensure fair
treatment, not necessarily precisely equal time, to the various
sides. Moreover, unlike section 315, the fairness doctrine does
not necessarily require the station to offer time to any outside
person, group, or agency. If the station's programming is such
that fairness is accorded to all sides over a reasonable period of
time, then the station's obligations are at least theoretically met.
An exception to the above is the so-called "personal attack"
rule which requires that, where a station makes a personal attack on a specific individual or group, it must provide the individual attacked with a script or tape of the broadcast prior to
or at the time of the broadcast and with a specific offer of time
to reply.25 ' This rule has now been codified into specific regulations which have extended it not only to require opportunity
to reply to personal attacks but also to require the station to
offer rebuttal time in the case of editorial endorsements of or
opposition to qualified political candidates. 25 2 These rules reflect an evolving crystallization, if not rigidification, of the
fairness doctrine from a general obligation of responsibility into
fixed regulations prescribing specific licensee duties. The wisdom of such regulatory policy is certainly open to question.
The Commission's enforcement of the fairness doctrine is
substantially similar to its enforcement of section 315, except
that it is possibly even more informal. Upon complaint that a
licensee has not accorded fair coverage to a controversial public
issue, the Commission forwards the complaint to the licensee
and demands a reply. If the reply does not satisfy the Commission, it informs the station of the error of its ways, indicating
253
perhaps that the matter may be considered at renewal time.
of how
In addition, it may demand from the licensee a statement
254
future.
the
in
doctrine
fairness
the
with
it will comply
A notification to the applicant that the matter will be con251. Billings Broadcasting Co., 23 P & F RADIo REG. 951 (1962);
Clayton W. Mapoles, 23 P & F RADIo REG. 586 (1962); Times-Mirror
Broadcasting Co., 24 P &F RADIO REG. 404, 407 (1962).
252. Fairness Doctrine Rules, 10 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1901, 1903
(1967). Appeals challenging the rules have been taken in the Second

and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals. BROADCASTING

31, 1967, at 23-24.
253. See 1965 FCC ANN.

REP.

MAGAZINE,

July

89-92.

254. E.g., Letters to Taft Broadcasting Co. and WBRE-TV, Public
Notice-G No. 73,787 (Sept. 24, 1965); New Broadcasting Co. (WLIB),
6 P & F RADIo REG. 258 (1950).
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sidered at renewal time is precisely the kind of "lifted eyebrow"
technique which the Commission has successfully employed in
other aspects of broadcast regulation. Generally, it is not so
much the possible loss of its license as the possibility of being
forced through the ordeal of a hearing which makes the informal
letter-telegram procedure effective. To reinforce this informal
procedure, the Commission has in one recent case issued a oneyear renewal where a station's presentation of controversial
public issues had been of questionable fairness. 255 Finally, if
the fairness doctrine has been incorporated into section 315, then
enforcement methods such as cease and desist orders and fines
should be at least theoretically available. The Commission has
not as yet resorted to these methods although it may well do
particularly in enforcing its new personal attack
so in the future,
25 6
regulations.
2. First Amendment Implications
The operation of the equal time rule imposes a significant
restraint on broadcasters' discretion and responsibility in choice
of programming. Its effects are to compel the licensee to offer
time for political programs which, if left to his own discretion,
he might not otherwise broadcast, and to compel the licensee
to refuse to present programs which he would otherwise broadcast in order to avoid the burden of complying or the risk of
not complying with this requirement. The latter restraint is
probably the more significant because it is here that the requirement for equal time to all candidates, including minority
and fringe candidates, has its most immediate impact upon political broadcasting. CBS President Frank Stanton, one of the
most persistent and vocal critics of section 315, has contended
that
The inescapable conclusion is that Section 315 does far more
harm than good, and that its result is neither to increase diversity of opinion nor expand free speech but rather as a practical
matter of practical necessity is compelled suppression and blackout. This compulsion is as simple as it is obvious: Time and
time again radio and television have been unable to present
candidates to the American people because broadcasters have
known that under Section 315 a half hour to a Democratic or
255. Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 205
(1965).

256. A major purpose for the Commission's recent codification of
the "personal attack" rule is to crystallize its policy sufficiently that
it can be enforced by specific sanction such as fine. See Fairness Doctrine Rules, 10 P & F RADIo REa. 2d 1901, 1904 (1967).
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Republican candidate can mean a total of 4, 8 or 16 half hours
to obscure and unknown opponents. So when a half hour has
had to be multiplied to 8 hours, we have had to forego the half
hour, the result257has been less, not more, broadcasting in the
public interest.
Congress recognized the significant restraint imposed on
broadcasters by the equal time requirements in 1960 when it
suspended section 315 for presidential and vice-presidential can25
didates.
As in the case of the equal time requirements of section 315,
it seems undeniable that the fairness doctrine acts as a significant
restraint on the broadcaster's choice of programming and represents a substantial intrusion by the Commission into the area
of program selection. While the nature of the restraints imposed is basically similar for both the equal time requirements
and the fairness doctrine, there are important substantive differences.
First, the equal time requirement focuses on personalities
rather than directly on program content, though it may indirectly affect program content to some extent. There is no requirement, for example, that the Commission examine the content of a
particular broadcast to determine whether its standards are met
in the case of equal time. On the other hand, the fairness doctrine
is predicated on just such an examination, evaluation, and judgment by the Commission of specific program content. The fairness doctrine cannot be applied without the Commission making
a determination that the content of the program is of such nature as in its judgment requires opportunity for presentation of
opposing views. This aspect of the fairness doctrine is crucial
from a first amendment viewpoint since the restraint on free
speech grows directly out of an examination and judgment by
the Commission of program content.
Second, unlike the equal time requirement, which has a narrow scope and correspondingly imposes only a limited degree
of restraint, the scope of the general fairness doctrine is sweepingly broad. While equal time is limited to a relatively short
period prior to elections, the fairness doctrine is always applicable. While equal time affects only programs involving a
legally qualified candidate for public office, the fairness doctrine
257. Hearings on Political Broadcasting Before the Communications
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1959) (statement of Frank Stanton, President
of CBS).
258. Pub. L. No. 86-677, 74 Stat. 554 (1960).
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affects all programming which involves controversial public issues. Thus the effect upon program choice is infinitely greater
in the case of the fairness doctrine. A broadcaster, faced with
the possibility that he may have to give time to candidates B, C,
and D if he makes time available to candidate A may well forego
giving time to A. The program choice foreclosed is limited.
Compare, however, the alternatives faced by a broadcaster who
is considering a public discussion program, a commentary series,
or editorials. He is met at the outset with the possibility that if
he touches on any significant public issue, even if he does not
judge it to be controversial, it may give rise to an obligation to
provide time to opposing viewpoints. The problem will not
arise just once or twice, but may arise on hundreds of occasions.
Virtually every topic which might be worth discussing or commenting upon is likely to be considered by the Commission to be
a controversial issue of public importance which obligates him
to seek out and provide an opportunity for the expression of opposing viewpoints. The most conscientious broadcaster may well
have very substantial qualms about presenting controversial
public issues when he is required to be fair by someone else's
standards, particularly if the someone else happens to be the
government.
The almost infinite reach of the fairness doctrine is most
graphically illustrated by the Commission's recent ruling that a
station which presents cigarette advertising "has the duty of informing its audience of the other side of this controversial issue
of public importance-that however enjoyable, such smoking
may be a hazard to the smoker's health."2 59 This is the first
time the fairness doctrine has been held applicable to routine
advertising. To say the least, such an application of the doctrine
raises a question whether there is any kind of broadcast message
259. Letter to WCBS-TV, 9 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1423, 1424, petition
for reconsideration denied, 11 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1921 (1967). The
ruling was issued on complaint. An appeal has been filed by the NAB on
behalf of the broadcasting industry (and, by reasonable assumption,
on behalf of the cigarette industry) in the Fourth Circuit challenging
the ruling on essentially the following grounds: (1) it conflicts with
the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, (2) it exceeds the
Commission's statutory authority, (3) it violates the first and fifth
amendments, and (4) it is procedurally defective. These are the same
grounds urged before the Commission in seeking reconsideration. See
BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, Sept. 18, 1967, at 34-38. Complainant, a lawyer
in the vein of Ralph Nader, has also filed an appeal in the District of
Columbia Circuit claiming that the ruling does not go far enough. Id.
The latter appeal is an obvious race-to-the-courthouse attempt to get
review in a sympathetic court.
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which, in any context, touches even tangentially on a controversial issue to which the fairness doctrine does not apply. For example, does the advertising of automobiles give rise to an obligation to permit Ralph Nader to present his views on automotive
safety?2 610 The Commission rejected such implications of its ruling as simply a "parade of horribles" and emphasized that here
the decisive criteria were the "governmental and private reports
and congressional action" stressing the danger of smoking and
urging persons to cease. 26 1 But the distinction seems paper-thin,
particularly since nothing in the way the fairness doctrine has
been applied in other contexts suggests that the presence or absence of governmental action or concern is of decisive importance.
And even if it is, the ruling still has potentially limitless ramifications considering the range of issues with which the government is concerned. For example, does the advertising of vitamin
supplements require a station to give air time to Dr. Goddard
to present the FDA's views 26 2 on the questionable need for such
supplements?
Perhaps the most startling thing about the cigarette ruling
is that it requires continuing presentations by the station of the
viewpoint that smoking is a health hazard because cigarette commercials are presented on a continuing basis. The Commission
made clear that the station must allocate sufficient time to the
opposing viewpoint each week. Moreover, the obligation to
present the opposing view extends to giving time on the air
without charge if that is necessary to achieve the requisite
fairness. Indeed, it is evident from the Commission's letteropinion that it contemplated that the obligation would be met
at least partially by public service announcements of the American Cancer Society or HEW in this field.2 6 3 Thus the impact
which can logically be expected from this ruling is a continuing
one.
However, notwithstanding the above objections, it is possible
that on the present state of the law the ruling is immune from
first amendment attack insofar as it involves advertising, although arguably this should make no difference here where the
Commission is applying a rule applicable generally to the dissemination of ideas regardless of whether the particular ideas
260. See R.
261.

NADER,

ANY SPEED (1965).
2d at 1929-30 (1967).

UNSAFE AT

11 P & F RADIO

REG.

262. See, e.g., "Health and the Consumer," Address by Goddard,
Annual Meeting of the Food Industries of the Nutrition Foundation,
June 8, 1967.
263. 9 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1423 (June 2, 1967).
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happen to be embodied in an advertising message.263 a The
restraining effect of the fairness doctrine is compounded for
the broadcaster by its vague and indefinite standards. The
vagueness and uncertainty are inherent first in the definition of
what constitutes a 'controversial public issue giving rise to the
obligation to be fair. The cigarette advertising ruling is an illustration of the potential sweeping inclusiveness of this element.
There is also uncertainty as to what fairness requires the licensee
to do in any particular circumstances. Uncertainty as to the elements of the doctrine and what it requires must inevitably
cause a greater restraint on broadcaster discretion than would
otherwise be the case. Thus the broadcaster may forego a wider
range of programming in order to guard against the possibility
that the fairness doctrine might apply, or he may broadcast programs expressing viewpoints opposing those of an original broadcast where it may not actually be necessary under a reasonable
interpretation of the doctrine. The fairness doctrine is likely to
have a particularly dampening effect on the quality of station
advocacy such as editorializing. Advocacy by its nature seldom
involves a complete and unbiased exposure of all contrasting
views by the advocate. Were every advocate required to give
such a full and unbiased treatment of all views, few would find
advocacy and controversy worth the effort.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that many
broadcasters forego controversial public issue programming, being content to play it safe with planned, noncontroversial subjects of the "mother-and-home" variety. But even this alternative may not avoid trouble since the Commission takes the position that the presentation of controversial public issues pro264
gramming is an affirmative duty of every licensee.
A distinction somewhat similar to that between equal time
and the fairness doctrine can arguably be made between the
fairness doctrine as it is applied to controversial public issues
and the so-called personal attack principle,26 5 which has developed out of the fairness doctrine. The personal attack principle
represents a considerable extension of the fairness doctrine as
traditionally applied insofar as it fixes an absolute duty to offer
263a. See note 162 and accompanying text supra. The Commission
only noted in passing the question of whether advertising is protected
speech, but did not rule that it is not protected. 11 P & F RADIo REG.
2d at 1908 n.4 (1967).
264. Editorializing by Licensees, 1 P & F RADIO REG. 91:201, 91:
206 (1949).

265. See text accompanying notes 251-.52 supra.
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to the person attacked an opportunity to reply. It is in this respect basically similar to the equal time requirements of section
315, except that it is not confined to political candidates. While
the personal attack principle is an extended application of the
fairness doctrine, it does not represent quite the same constitutional problems. The vagaries and sweeping scope of the fairness doctrine are not inherent in the personal attack principle.
Correspondingly, the compulsion to present ideas and speech
which the broadcaster would otherwise not present is far less
sweeping, and the inhibition on ideas and speech is far less
broad where the broadcaster is required to afford the right to
reply only to one who is personally attacked than where the
broadcaster is required to give a fair presentation of controversial public issues. Moreover, a case can be made for the right
to reply to a personal attack, at least where the attack is libelous, near-libelous, or arguably libelous. Professor Chafee persuasively argued that in such cases a legislative requirement imposing a duty to permit a reply to such statements is preferable
to punishing or inhibiting defamation through libel and slander
suits, and probably no more unconstitutional. 266 It should be
emphasized, however, that this argument does not single out
radio and television stations: it applies equally to newspapers
and other mass communication media.2 67 Indeed, one state
2 68
has a statute imposing such a duty on newspapers.

How-

ever, even this limited right to reply to defamatory statements, whether applied to broadcasters or newspapers, seems
to be of questionable wisdom and even more doubtful constitutionality. Moreover, even if its constitutionality were recognized, it would not justify either the fairness doctrine as it is
generally applied or the rule which requires stations to afford
an opportunity to reply to editorial endorsement of or opposition to political candidates. In the case of the personal attack
principle, justification and constitutional sanction might be
found in a long tradition of remedying defamation, antedating
the first amendment. No such tradition affords a remedy in the
case of one who merely takes a stand on controversial public
issues. No such tradition compels one always to give all sides
of the story.
266.

1 Z. CHAFES, GovERNMENT AND MAss COMUVnRICATIONS

MVEDIA

172, 184-90 (Comm'n on Freedom of the Press ed. 1947). Professor
Chafee points out, however, that there are some very serious difficulties with and objections to a legislative command to afford a right
of reply. Id. at 180-84.
267. Id. at 184-90.
268. Nzv. Rnv. STAT. ch. 200.570 (1965).
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The basic rationalization for the Commission's fairness doctrine, as for its general standards for presenting "balanced" programming, is that the licensee, bound by statutory policy to
serve the public interest, must fairly present balanced and diversified programming so as to meel the needs and interests of
all of the public. This rationalization rests on the assumption
that, because the licensee has something of a monopoly in regard to access to and use of broadcast facilities, it is necessary
and justifiable to compensate for this monopoly by requiring
that he present all types of programming and all points of view
which, by hypothesis, would be presented if there were no technological barriers to entry into broadcasting.
On this assumption, the Commission generally refuses to
acknowledge any of the significant first amendment implications posed by its regulation of programming. Perhaps the most
succinct single statement of its view is set forth in its 1949 Edi269
torializingReport:
We believe ... that a requirement that broadcast licensees
utilize their franchises in a manner in which the listening public may be assured of hearing varying opinions on the paramount issues facing the American people is within both the
spirit and letter of the First Amendment. [Tlhe Supreme Court
of the United States ... pointed [this] out in the Associ-"
ated Press monopoly case. (Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20).

We fully recognize that freedom of the radio is included
among the freedoms protected against governmental abridgment by the First Amendment ....
But this does not mean that
the freedom of the people as a whole to enjoy the maximum
possible utilization of this medium of mass communication may
be subordinated to the freedom of any single person to exploit
the medium for his own private interest.
Despite this army of high-sound[ing words and phrases, the
basic premise on which the Commission justifies its intrusion
into the program field is simply too tenuous to sustain such
potentially far-reaching powers. Notwithstanding the Commission's rationalization in terms of the right of the public to receive diversified and balanced presentation of public issues, it
has refused to consider whether or not, on a given issue, the
public has received such a balanced presentation from all the
various public media taken as a whole. It has ruled that each
licensee must present all sides of a public issue irrespective of
what other media and other radio and television stations pre269.

(1949)...

Editorializingby Licensees, 1 P & F RADIo REG. 91:201, 91:210-11
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sent.270 If the right of the public to receive diverse and balanced viewpoints is the decisive desideratum, it is curious, to
say the least, that the Commission purposely insists on ignoring
the question of whether the public is in fact receiving diverse
and balanced presentations from existing communications media
as a whole.
Moreover, the Commission's concern over licensees' use of

public facilities for private purposes at the expense of the public
is something of a red herring. The real issue is not whether the

licensee has a right to exploit his license or to abuse its privileges,
for example, by using the station to broadcast his own private
views or to promote his own biases or interests, ignoring all public interests and needs. Those who oppose the Commission's fairness doctrine are not arguing for the rights of the licensee to be
unfair or to use licensed facilitiees for a purely personal cause
or aim. The question is who should have the responsibility;
whose concept of fairness should be applied? If it is "unfair"
for an advocate to put forward his own views without giving
full and unbiased exposure to other opposing views, one may
wonder whether any true advocacy is or can ever be "fair."
Finally, the Commission's reliance on the AP antitrust case
is misplaced. As previously discussed, 271 the first amendment
does not proscribe general economic and social regulation of the
type involved in the AP antitrust case and the AP labor law
case.2 72 There is, however, a marked difference between regulation of the economic structure of a communications industry
which is designed to protect the basic minimum conditions in
which free, diversified speech may develop and regulation which
attempts directly to ensure such diversified speech by examining
the speech itself to see if it meets the tests of balance, fairness,
and diversity. It seems more than doubtful that Justice Black,
who wrote the majority opinion in the AP antitrust case, or indeed any of the justices who joined him, supposed that by affirming the application of the Sherman Act to newspapers, he
was affirming the power of the government to pass upon the
balance, diversity, or fairness of newspapers, even those enjoying
a natural monopoly position. The NBC case is no more dispositive than the AP case. Despite the Court's rather sweeping
opinion which suggests sanction for all manner of Commission
270. See Jorgensen, Schwartz & Woods, Programming Diversity in
Proposals for New Broadcast Licenses, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 769
(1964).
271. See Part I supra.
272. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
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regulation in the public interest, the issue before the Court was
the Commission's power to adopt essentially economic regulations similar in substance and purpose to the antitrust law sustained in the AP antitrust case. In both cases the difference
between such broad socio-economic regulation and direct regulation of programming is obvious. To pass from the former to
the latter without distinction is to pass beyond the elusive but
nevertheless important line which separates speech in a free,
open society from speech controlled by the government in the
2 73
public interest-the earmark of a closed society.
3. The Red Lion Case
27 4
Although a number of court decisions previously discussed
have upheld the constitutionality of various aspects of Commission program regulation, some in rather sweeping terms, the
constitutionality of the Commission's fairness doctrine went unchallenged in the courts until the recent decision in Red Lion

BroadcastingCompany v. FCC275 involving personal attacks by a

licensee.
Following the 1964 presidential elections petitioner-licensee
broadcast a program which included a discussion of the election
and a book by a Mr. Cook about the Republican campaign. The
personal attack consisted of a charge that Cook, a newspaperman, had been fired for having made a false charge against an
unnamed New York City official. Contrary to the Commission's personal attack policy, the licensee failed to notify Cook of
273.
from K.

The phrases "open society" and "closed society" are borrowed
POPPER,

THE OPEN SociEry AND ]ITS ENEmiEs

(4th ed. 1963).

To some the association of the Commission's regulation of radio
and television programming with the attitude of the closed society will
undoubtedly seem hyperbole. Some-those believing in the good intentions and motivations of the Commission in this concededly difficult
and delicate area-will perhaps even treat this association with derision. There should not be any doubt that the Commission has acted
on the highest of motivations and good intentions and it has not been
altogether insensitive, at least as to some of the more obvious constitutional problems in this area. The fact remains, however, that the first
amendment was designed to protect against well-intentioned, well-motivated interference with free speech as well as that which stems from a
less well-intentioned social philosophy.
274. See, e.g., Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351 (D.C.

Cir. 1949); Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n,
62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); KFKB
Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.
1931); text accompanying notes 115-18, 133-35, 208-11 supra.
275. 10 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 2001 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert.

filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3100 (U.S. Sept. 11, 1967).
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the attack or to furnish him with a transcript of the program
and refused Cook's request for free time to respond to the attack.
Following receipt of the complaint from Cook, the Commission
issued a letter to the licensee ruling that it had violated the fairness doctrine and requested it to advise the Commission of its
"plans to comply with the 'fairness doctrine'." 276 In response
to the licensee's request for a ruling, the Commission affirmed
the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine as it was applied to
this situation.
On appeal the licensee challenged the constitutionality of
the fairness doctrine on four grounds: (1) section 315 of the
Act, the chief statutory authority for the fairness doctrine,
constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power;
(2) the fairness doctrine is unconstitutionally vague; (3) the
fairness doctrine infringes upon the ninth and tenth amendments insofar as it violates the licensee's right to engage in political activity and insofar as it infringes upon powers reserved
to the people; and (4) the fairness doctrine violates the first
amendment. 277 Each ground was rejected by the court.
As to the first ground, the question of delegation in itself
adds virtually nothing to the arguments that the fairness doctrine is unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutionally restrictive of free speech. If the latter arguments can be satisfactorily
resolved there seems no tenable basis for attacking the delegation itself and, of course, if either of the latter arguments is upheld, the delegation question loses any significance.2 7 3 As to
the argument based on the ninth and tenth amendments, it is
276. Id. at 2006-08.
277. Id. at 2004.
278. Setting aside the issue of free speech, or the issue of vagueness such as would offend due process, the question of the constitutionality of the delegation seems fully disposed of by a line of authority too long to recite in its entirety. The standards of § 315
which were challenged,--"reasonable opportunity," "sufficient time for
full discussion," "controversial issues of public importance," and others,
id. at 2014-may indeed be broad and uncertain, but considered under
the issue of delegability they are quite obviously no broader or more
uncertain than standards which have been repeatedly upheld. See, e.g.,
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (authorizing recovery of
"excess profits" under the Renegotiation Act); Federal Radio Comm'n
v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933) (regulation of licenses under the standard of "public interest, convenience, and
necessity" under the Radio Act of 1927); Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 423-5 (1944) (administrator under Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942 given power to fix prices which "in his judgment will be
generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of this
Act").
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difficult to know what to make of the licensee's contentions.

Reliance on the ninth and tenth amendments was evidently predicated on Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut,279 and the theory that the ninth and tenth amendments constitute some kind of residuum of protected rights not
elsewhere enumerated in the Constitution. The court's rejection of this argument in Red Lion seems undeniably correct.
There is neither historical authority nor solid constitutional
precedent for the proposition that the ninth and tenth amendments embody any specific constitutional rights. While, as Justice Goldberg pointed out, the ninth and tenth amendments indicate that the first eight amendments are not preclusive of
other fundamental rights not enumerated, it is impossible to
find in them any hint of what such other fundamental rights
might be. Moreover, Justice Goldberg's use of the ninth and
tenth amendments was dubious enough when applied in Griswold as a basis for "filling in" the interstices between specific
constitutional guarantees. It would be even more dubious to
apply the two amendments to the Red Lion situation where
other specific constitutional provisions are directly in issue.
Such an interpretation of the ninth and tenth amendments
would cause the entire Bill of Rights to be all but swallowed up
in these two virtually forgotten amendments.
The licensee's vagueness argument appears on its face to be
somewhat more persuasive. Viewing the fairness doctrine in
general, it can hardly be denied that it is vague and uncertain
in its scope and application. However, the vagueness argument
seems misdirected here.
In the sense in which it is mcst widely understood and
applied, the void-for-vagueness doctrine is based on the need
to give fair notice to the individual as to what is unlawful. The
evils sought to be eliminated are twofold: the subjection of a
person to threat of punishment when he cannot know that his
conduct is unlawful, 8 0 and the restraint of a person from engaging in protected conduct because of the threat that the broad
and vague reach of the statute may proscribe such conduct.28 '
In addition to the notice aspect, the vagueness doctrine has been
279. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
280. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
281. See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). On the distinction between the two evils inherent in "fair notice" cases, see Note,
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
Rzv. 67, 76 (1960).
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applied as a limitation on the discretionary powers which may
be given to a lower court, an administrative agency, or official. 28 2 In this latter aspect the doctrine assumes a somewhat
broader scope and limits grants of overly broad discretion to
trial judges and agencies to impose restraints without clear
standards by which the lawfulness of their decisions or possible
283
intrusions into areas of protected conduct may be tested.
The court's opinion in Red Lion does not analyze the differing applications of the vagueness doctrine. It appears to have
regarded the issue as solely a question of fair notice to the individual. 284 But, despite this blurring of important distinctions,
the court's rejection of the vagueness doctrine may be justified
since none of the evils which the doctrine is intended to correct
were present in this case. While absence of fair notice and the
evil of overbroadness may well be present in the fairness doctrine generally, there is no problem of fair notice as to what
constitutes a controversial public issue in the personal attack
type of case. It would strain credulity for the licensee to assert
that it could not determine with fair certainty whether it was
engaged in a personal attack. Neither is the standard overbroad
in that it gives too much discretion to the agency; the standard
of "personal attack" is no more elusive or vague for the agency
to apply than it is for the licensee to understand. The same is
true of the particular obligations imposed on the licensee here.
Unlike the case of the general fairness doctrine, as applied to
controversial issues, the personal attack principle is quite definite in the obligations which it imposes on licensees and the
standard to be enforced by the agency. Like the equal time requirement of section 315, the personal attack principle requires
282. See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966). See
also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Hague v. C.I.O.,
307 U.S. 496 (1939). For a persuasive and well-documented exposition
of this and related aspects of the vagueness doctrine see Note, The
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
67 (1960).
283. Obviously at some point as the vagueness doctrine is applied to
strike down broad authorizations by the legislatures to the courts or
agencies, it becomes almost impossible to distinguish the vagueness
doctrine from the substantive rights, such as free speech, which are
ultimately being protected. However, to the extent the vagueness doctrine has any independent significance, such a distinction must be recognized. The court in Red Lion appears not to have done so since its
opinion tends to fuse the vagueness problem with the free speech question itself.
284. The licensee relied on Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385 (1926), a "notice case," and the court dealt with the argument
essentially on that basis. 10 P & F RADIo REG. 2d at 2017-20 (1967).
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in all cases a specific offer of rebuttal time. The licensee's duty
and the court's mandate under this requirement seem sufficiently
clear.
There remains, however, the first amendment issue, and
here the court's opinion is clearly less satisfying. Predictably,
the Commission in its argument pointed out the public nature
of the frequencies, the broadcaster's fiduciary responsibility to
present all viewpoints, its duty to serve the public interest and
these
recited the usual cases. In substance the court approved
285
arguments in rejecting the first amendment challenge.
However, the court did not rest its decision simply on the
licensee's duties and public responsibilities, but went on to conclude that the application of the personal attack principle,
or the fairness doctrine in general, did not in fact restrain the
licensee's freedom of speech. At one place the court noted
that
petitioners are not prohibited from broadcasting any program
[they] are not furnished
which petitioners think suitable ....
with a mandatory program format, nor does the Doctrine decontroversial issues are to be the subject of
fine which, if28any,
6
broadcasting.
Elsewhere it stated:
The petitioners are in no manner exposed to or subject to any
prior censorship of their broadcasts. Their latitude in the selection of program material, program substance, program format,
and identity of program format, and identity of program perof the public
sonnel is bounded only by their own 28determination
7
interest appeal of their end product.

In response to the assertion that a fear of punishment may act
as a restraint upon free speech the court stated:
The remedial provisions of Title 47 U.S.C., the Administrative

Procedure Act, and the accessibility of the courts guarantee
or capricious conpetitioners full redress from illegal, arbitrary,
23 s
duct on the part of the Commission.
This reasoning is a mixture of naivet6, incorrect facts, and
faulty legal analysis. The court's assumption that the broadcaster has complete discretion in selection of programming is
simply incorrect. Apart from the restrictions discussed in some
detail previously,2 8 9 there is the Cormmission's fairness doctrine
itself, one command of which is that the licensee must present
controversial public issues programming as part of its duty to
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 2022-25; see also 2018-20.
Id. at 2018.
Id. at 2024.
Id. at 2025.
See discussion, supra, Part II: A, B, and C.
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serve the public interest.290 The court's evident conclusion that
because there is no direct control and no prior restraint of progranuming, there is no restraint resulting from the Commission's
fairness doctrine is unrealistic and legally erroneous. To the
extent the free exercise of speech is conditioned upon the speaker's doing something which he would not otherwise do because
of the threat of incurring some penalty, there is a clear restraint.
The court's conclusion to the contrary and its apparent insistence
on some form of prior restraint is directly contrary to the constitutional principles settled more than thirty-five years ago in
Near v. Minnesota.291 Finally, the court's conclusion that the
alleged restraint resulting from Commission sanctions and from
the fear of punishment is somehow dissolved by the availability
of judicial review and adequate safeguards against arbitrary
Commission action is naive. Although the availability of review
and the applicability of standards may be relevant in deciding
whether a restraint is a permissible one, the restraint is no less
real by reason of its being reviewable, and no less substantial
because it is not arbitrarily imposed. A court cannot avoid its
responsibility of deciding whether the action of the agency, including agency sanctions or the threat of such sanctions, constitutes an impermissible restraint on speech merely because it can
review the agency's actions. Obviously once the review is made,
a decision must be made at least with respect to the agency's
action in the case before it. Undoubtedly the court did not mean
to suggest that there could never be an impermissible restraint
merely because of the availability of judicial review. Yet it
seems to have used the availability of review as an excuse for
refusing to consider the permissible extent of the restraint imposed by the application of the Commission's fairness doctrine.
The Red Lion opinion is simply inadequate. One might
argue that whether the general fairness doctrine is valid or not,
the personal attack principle is sufficiently different in purpose,
scope, and effect to be upheld.292 Had the court confined itself
to the personal attack rules and attempted to so limit the scope
of its holding, its decision might be at least defensible, even if
questionable. Unfortunately, the court recognized no distinction
between the broad scope of the fairness doctrine and the more
limited personal attack rule. On the contrary, the court couched
290. Editorializing by Licensees, 1 P & F RADIo REG. 91:201, 206
(1949).
291. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
292. See text accompanying notes 265-68 supra.
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its opinion in the broadest terms, reaching conclusions which are
not merely unconvincing but plainly erroneous in their generality. The larger questions were passed over too easily with
irrelevancies and facile reasoning.
Most notably the court's opinion makes no effort to penetrate the basic assumption on which the Commission's arguments
and conclusions rest and which is central to the entire first
amendment issue: the assumption that radio communication is
unique and, being unique, is subject to interference with freedom
of speech that the court would never tolerate if applied to other
communications media.
III.

TOWARDS A GENERAL RATIONALE FOR REGULATION: SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT THE
NATURE OF RADIO AND TELEVISION

The Commission, as has been seen, has little if any well
defined policy or philosophy of program regulation as such.
Indeed, it has persistently refused to acknowledge that it "regulates" programming or that its actions are in any significant way
a restraint of or an interference with free speech. About all one
can say is that the Commission requires that: (a) a broadcaster
must not permit his station to be used for broadcasting indecent,
defamatory, or otherwise unlawful program material; (b) a
broadcaster must at least take some steps to ascertain local programming interests and to meet such interests in a responsible
manner; (c) a broadcaster must present "balanced" programming in accordance with certain general standards (set by the
Commission); and (d) a broadcaster must be "fair" in presenting controversial issues or political broadcasts. These are standards which in themselves may seem difficult to oppose. Indeed,
to take issue with them seems almost like attacking the Boy
Scout Oath. But the issue here is not whether these standards
are acceptable standards of conduct. The question is whether
or not the FCC has any right to imposa such standards.
Ultimately, the justification advanced for the Commission's
vaguely conceived and dimly illumined policies toward nontechnical regulation, particularly in the area of programming, centers around the basic assumption that, whatever may be the
application of the first amendment to common forms of expression or to other mass communications media, the rules are different for radio and television because ;hey are unique. There are
varying explanations given by the courts, by the Commission,
and by critical observers as to why radio and television are
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unique. The principal explanations can be fairly summarized
into four basic arguments: 293 (1) unlike other communications
media, private or public, the means of communications which
radio and television use are publicly owned; 294 (2) radio and
television communications are uniquely affected with the public
interest, and the use of airways is a privilege to be granted to
2 95
broadcasters only so long as they continue to serve the public;
(3) radio and television are uniquely influential and powerful
as communications media; 296 and (4) unlike other communications media, private or public, there are physical and technical
limitations imposed on access to and the use of the radio and
television media.2 97 Without question each of these notions contains some germ of the truth. The problem is that they have
become more than just arguments to be analyzed and critically
evaluated. They have become ideologies which have taken the
place of thoughtful reasoning. Comment about the "unique"
nature of broadcasting has become so far removed from practical
considerations that it has become a kind of modem-day analogue
to the medieval discourses on the number of angels that can
stand on the head of a pin.
One of the most persistent of modem shibboleths used in
support of virtually every form of FCC regulation has been the
proposition that the airways and broadcast spectrum are owned
by the public, that is, they are "public domain" administered in
trust for the public by the FCC. According to this theory, the
broadcast licensee is permitted to use this public domain only
so long as it serves the public interest, as determined by the
FCC.298 Because of this public ownership, the Commission has
a broad regulatory authority and even a duty to oversee all aspects of the licensee's use of such public property. According to
293. For a good, brief discussion of the principal arguments, see
Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: The Broadcaster's Dilemma, 32
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 719, 757-66 (1964). See also Pierson, The Need
for Modification of Section 326, 18 FED. CoM. B.J. 15, 25-26 (1963);
Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 tR~lv. L. REv. 701,
713 (1964).
294. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 205-07 (1963).
295. See Television Corp. v. FCC, 294 F.2d 730, 733-34 (D.C. Cir.
1961); S. REP. No. 994, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, 1 (1962).
296. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1898 Before the Communications
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1960).
297. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 215-16 (1943); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n,
47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931).

298. H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 205-07 (1963).
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proponents of this argument, this necessarily includes overseeing
the station's program operations.
As is true of so many of the concepts which have become
encrusted on the law, there is a superficial appeal in the public
domain idea which makes it hard to dispel, even in the minds of
those whom one would not assume disposed to the type of constitutional intrusions which it is used to support. 299 Little effort
has ever been made to look beneath the superficiality of the
concept of public ownership of the broadcast spectrum to determine whether it has any practical logic or meaning. Logically
the concept is meaningless. To say that the airways or spectrum
can be owned by anyone is simply to indulge in fantasy. Surely
no one seriously supposes that the al-rways are a thing of nature
which can be possessed, occcupied, or used in any normal sense
of the word. In actuality, "airways" is merely convenient shorthand, an abstraction for a phenomenon created as a result of
the use of privately owned transmission facilities. The "spectrum" is a purely artificial construct of the Commission itself.
To give this construct an independent nature and then attempt
to justify the regulation itself in those terms is entirely circular.
It is like saying that the Commission owns the frequencies because it has the power to regulate their use, and that it has the
power to regulate their use because it owns them.
One may perhaps speak with some sense about public ownership of air rights or space through which electrical impulses
are transmitted, but this is quite different. Moreover, even this
concept will not support any claim for rightful regulation. All
such air space is not publicly owned. And even if it were all
publicly owned, this would not support regulation of broadcast communications or speech as distinguished from any other
299. Justice Douglas, whom few would accuse of being an apologist
for regulation of free speech under any pretext, appears to have accepted
the public domain theory in conjunction with the "spectrum scarcity"
argument, as justifying different rules for radio and television:
We have, of course, a system of licensing for radio and television stations. But the problem there is quite different. The
channels all lie in the public domain, the air space above the
earth being under the exclusive control of Congress. The
channels are restricted in number. Itis necessary to regulate
all if interference is to be kept at a minimum and service is
to be efficient. What the government owns or controls in the
airways it can regulate as it sees fit.
W.

DOUGLAS, RIGHT OF T=E PEOPLE

76-77 (1958).

A more extreme statement of the case for plenary regulation by
the FCC could scarcely have been made by the FCC itself. It should
be emphasized, however, that the loose, even offhand, observations in a
book are not the same as a carefully considered judicial decision.
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kind of communication or speech. If, for example, this hypothetical public ownership of air space is a basis for regulating
broadcast speech, is it not also a basis for regulating virtually
all types of speech that similarly use air space-in short, all
forms of oral communications from loudspeaker announcements
to backyard gossip? This is an absurd proposition, but how
would the distinguishing line between broadcasting and other
forms of speech be drawn? Clearly reliance on the ownership
concept itself provides no basis for such a distinction.
In any event the public ownership concept is plainly insufficient justification for government interference with free speech
under well-established constitutional doctrine. The Supreme
Court has made it emphatically clear, for example, that public
ownership of postal facilities does not justify censorship of the
content of private correspondence or other printed matter sent
through the mail. 300 Nor does public ownership of parks,
streets, or other property justify otherwise unconstitutional restraints on free speech.3 0 1 Public ownership of the airways,
whatever it may mean, is surely no exception.
In substance, the public ownership argument seems really
to be a paraphrase of a widely held, seldom well-stated assumption that because broadcasting is an activity "affected with a
public interest," restraints which would not otherwise be perprivate sector of society are warranted and
mitted in a purely
02
necessary.
even
While few would dispute that broadcasting is affected with
a public interest, this fact does not justify any intrusion on free
speech which would not otherwise be permissible. It is, therefore, neither controlling nor even particularly pertinent that
Congress concluded that broadcasting is affected with a public
interest, provided for periodic licensing of broadcast facilities,
and stated that a license to broadcast is purely a privilege and
not a right.303 The Supreme Court has made it emphatically
300. Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946).

301. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-4 (1951); Saia

v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (by implication); Hague v. CIO, 307

U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).

302. Television Corp. of Michigan, Inc. v. FCC, 294 F.2d 730 (D.C.
Cir. 1961). It should be pointed out that the context in which this
statement was made was not one involving any constitutional or even
statutory question of Commission authority. Rather, it was a wholly
gratuitous remark made in the course of admonishing the licensee and
the FCC that broadcasting must serve the public.
303. S. REP. No. 994, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, 1 (1962) (emphasis
in last sentence added). For the concurring view of former FCC
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clear that the right to license does not carry with it the right to
place unconstitutional limitations or conditions on the license
and particularly that it confers no authority to censor or interfere with free speech, whether or not the license be characterized
as a mere privilege.30 4 Indeed, far from expanding an agency's
powers with respect to first amendment freedoms, the authority
to license is a basis for even closer scrutiny of the agency's actions
in this respect. Recognizing that a degree of censorship may be
an inherent tendency in the exercise of administrative licensing
powers, the Court has indicated it will scrutinize such licensing
activities with particular care to ensure that they are not used
to override first amendment guarantee. 305
Implicit in many, if not most, of the arguments advanced
for a greater governmental interference with broadcast speech
than is permitted for other types of communications media is the
usually unarticulated assumption that broadcasting is uniquely
influential and powerful as a medium of communication.
There is perhaps a degree of truth in this belief, at least in
the case of television. 30 6 First, there is the immediacy of a televised message as compared with the printed word. For example,
few who watched the classic televised political campaign debates
between Kennedy and Nixon in 1960 would seriously question
that television had a far greater impact on each viewer than any
verbatim newspaper coverage would have. This is not to say
that news, editorials, and other public affairs information are
necessarily more effectively covered by broadcasting. But
item for item, a well-done television program is likely to
have far greater impact on the average person than is a comparable newspaper article.307 Second, the impact of radio and

Chairman Minow, see FREEDOM AND REsPON sIB I r

IN BROADCASTING

173 (Coons ed. 1961).
304. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1946); Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S.
529 (1922); see generally Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 Hnv.
L. REv. 1595 (1960).
305. See Sala v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1946); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
306. I would be inclined to doubt that the impact of a radio message
is anywhere near as strong as that of a well-written newspaper or
magazine story.
307. See 'Fairly, Can You Believe Your Eyes?, IX HoiuzoN 24 (1967),
for a persuasive commentary on the impact of television news programming. However, it must be admitted that the presumed impact of
television can be and sometimes is highly exaggerated. To many people, television has, like radio, become largely a background of music,
speech, or simply noise, a part of the din of civilization which many
need to hear but not necessarily pay any attention to.
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television in terms of the size of audience far exceeds that of any
other mass communications medium. Consider, for example, a
well known, regularly scheduled network news program, the
"Huntley-Brinkley Report." Nielson audience ratings for January 1967 indicate that during this period each broadcast reached
an average of nearly ten million homes.308 This is more than
three times the combined average daily circulation of the New
York Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, the Los
Angeles Times and the St. Louis Post Dispatch,30 9 five of the
largest and most influential newspapers in the country. Obviously it cannot be denied that television is an influential and
powerful communications medium.
It remains to be seen, however, whether adequate justification has been shown for greater government interference with
speech in the case of broadcasting than in the case of less powerful media. Although television may have a great effect in terms
of its immediacy and the extent of its audience, radio is not
nearly so effective. Yet no one has suggested that radio and
television might be regulated in differing degrees. In addition,
the influence and importance of any single television station,
which is the basic regulatory unit, has been misunderstood and
exaggerated. The audience test mentioned above, for example,
does not take into account that the audience reached by the
program is not the result of a single, monolithic voice but actually the voices of more than 700 individual stations. 310 Even
narrowing this number down to take into account those stations
under common ownership, it is apparent that there are a substantial number of different entities responsible. It may be
argued that since most local stations are merely outlets for the
three major networks and a handful of program suppliers that
it is the net effect of broadcasting as an industry which is the
essential fact in determining to what extent the FCC should
interfere with programming. But if this approach is accepted,
one must alter the comparative picture since newspapers, too,
have their networks. Like broadcast stations, newspapers often
speak with one voice-that of the Associated Press, United Press
308. BROADCASTING MAGAZINE, February 13, 1967, at 68. An entertainment special covered by the same reporting period, "The Bob Hope
Christmas Show," reached nearly 21 million homes. Id. at 66.
309. Based on the then current ABC circulation data, AYER & SONS,
DIRECTORY OF NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 106, 189, 284, 600, 767 (1965),

indicates the combined average daily circulation of these newspapers
to be 3,087,547.
310. 1966 FCC ANN. REP. 116-18 shows 721 television stations operating as of June 30, 1966.
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or other news service or, more accurately, that of the originating
source. The relative impact of television would thus seem comparable not to one newspaper or even five, but more realistically,
to all newspapers subscribing to a major news wire service.
Even if one unrealistically aggregates all of the television
stations under four headings according to their affiliation with
one of the three major networks or their independent status, and
even if one considers this as a potential of four distinct and
potentially different voices accounting for all broadcast programming, is this in itself grounds for government interference
with programming? Is it constitutionally necessary, in short,
to have at least a possibility of more than four distinct voices on
all subjects? We have only two national political parties which,
based on the same theory which leads us to believe that there
are only four potentially distinct broadcast voices, give us only
two political viewpoints. Does this warrant some form of government interference with political speech or perhaps government subsidization of a third party point of view? In all but a
handful of American cities there are, at the most, two daily
newspapers and thus, in theory, only two distinct and potentially different viewpoints from the daily press. Does this perhaps warrant government interference through subsidizing more
local newspapers or controlling the content of those newspapers
which do exist?
In the final anlaysis it is doubtful that the Supreme Court
would ever hold that the application of the first amendment's
protection- of free speech depends on any subtle and tenuous
evaluation of the influence of the speaker. Justice Douglas,
concurring in SuperiorFilms v. Department of Education stated:
Motion pictures are of course a different medium of expression
than the public speech, the radio, the stage, the novel, or the
magazine. But the First Amendment draws no distinction between the various methods of communicating ideas. On occasion one may be more powerful or effective than another ....
Which medium will give the most excitement and have the most
enduring effect will vary with the theme and the actors. It is
not for the censor to determine in any case.3 11
Although all of these various rationalizations concerning
the uniqueness of radio and television have occupied an important place in the ideology of broadcast regulation, ultimately the
rationale to which almost all return is that of "spectrum scarcity." As Justice Frankfurter stated in the NBC3 1 2 case, "Un311. 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (concurring opinion).
312. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226
(1943). For an excellent critical analysis of NBC and the spectrum
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like other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available
to all ... and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it
is subject to governmental regulation."
The most obvious shortcoming of Justice Frankfurter's logic
is that, notwithstanding conceded physical limitations on frequency availability and the corresponding limitation on the number of broadcast facilities which can be operated, the fact remains that radio and television stations are more numerous than
any of the other competing mass communications media. For
example, as of June 30, 1966, there were 5,881 radio and 721 television stations operating.313 The number of radio and television
stations is substantially greater than, for example, the number
of daily newspapers, of which there were 1,751 operating as of
January 1, 1966. 314 The disparity between the number of newspapers and the number of radio and television stations is most
strikingly evident when it is noted that only the largest cities
can boast two or more daily newspapers not under common
ownership. 315 By contrast virtually every city large enough to
have a daily newspaper is served by at least two television stations and several radio stations. 316 While the number of daily
newspapers has slowly declined, the number of competing radio
scarcity argument, see Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: The
Broadcaster'sDilemma, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 719, 757-66 (1964).
313. 1966 FCC ANN. REP. 116-18. This figure does not include
television translators and boosters. As of that date, there were an
additional 318 radio and 158 television stations (exclusive of translators
and boosters) authorized but not operating. Most of these latter are
stations which had received construction permits but had not then received licenses or "program test authority."
314.

U.S. BUREAU OF TE

CENsus,

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

UNITED STATES 523 (87th ed. 1966).
315. See AYER & SoNs, supra note 309, at 1250-71 (1965).
316. See 1967 TELEVISION FAcTBoox; 1967 BROADCASTING YEABOOK.
Although, except as the information is set forth throughout the above
standard references, there is no single published source which clearly
identifies the number of radio and television services which each city
receives, a fair idea of the multiple television service available is given
in a 1960 Nielson study, Television '60, which shows that some 94% of
all television homes (94% of all homes in the United States, see 1967
BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 18) can receive at least three television stations
and some 81% can receive at least four. No distinction is drawn here
between a city to which a station is licensed and a city which receives
service. Drawing such a distinction as a general proposition is unrealistic, at least so far as television is concerned. As a practical matter,
a station need not be physically located in or technically assigned to a
city in order to serve that city adequately, particularly where the cities
are part of the same culturally and socially integrated metropolitan
area.
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and television stations has rapidly increased and continues to
31 7
increase.
It is often said that the limitations on access to and use of
the newspaper medium is an economic limitation, not a technical one. The distinction, however, is entirely specious. Contrary
to common assumption, the spectrum is not nearly saturated.
There are few, if any, areas of the country today where additional radio and television stations are not technically possible. 318
Moreover, it is at least doubtful whether, given the present
structure of the industry, the spectrum will ever be competely
saturated with radio and television stations.3 19 Although there
is currently a trend towards an increased number of stations,
particularly UHF television stations, it seems unlikely that the
trend will continue to the technical saturation point. In almost
all radio and television markets, economic barriers to entry will
come into play before the technical barriers. The economic
limitations have already become the dispositive factor in the
growth of radio and television stations in many, if not most,
small and medium-sized markets. The barrier to entry to further stations in those areas is not the technical unavailability of
frequencies, but rather the economic inability of the area to support an additional station and the unavailability of sources of
programming different from that which is already being provided by the existing stations. This situation then is identical to
317. From 1950 to June 30, 1966, the number of radio stations on
the air more than doubled from 2,897 to 5,881; and the number
of television stations (exclusive of translators and boosters) increased
seven times, from 104 to 721. 1966 FCC ANN. REP. 116-18. By
contrast, from 1950 to January 1, 1966, the number of daily newspapers declined from 1,772 to 1,751. U.S. BUREAu OF THE CENsus,
STArisTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 523 (87th ed. 1966).
318. On February 9, 1966, the Commission adopted its newly revised, computer-determined Table of Assignments for television channels. Fifth Report, UHF Channel Assignments, 6 P & F RADIO REG. 2d
1643 (1966). The revised Table at that date provided for 1,756 fixed
VHF and UHF assignments (in 792 cities). Id. at 1667. However, the
Table made only two assignments in the upper UHF frequency band,
Channels 70-83, these channels proposed to be used for small "community" stations on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 1666. Thus, the 1,756 assignments (stations) do not include some 17% of the spectrum. Moreover, even as to channels below 70, the Table is not "saturated" and
thus there is space for additional assignments over and above the 1,756
reflected in the Table. Id. at 1649, 1673--74. See, e.g., UHF Channel
Assignments in Palm Springs, 8 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1533 (1966)
(adding another UHF channel to Palm Springs). In short, even with
present technology, there is, at a conservative estimate, room for three
or more times the 721 stations operating as of June 30, 1966. See note
318 supra.
319. See Second Report 1772.
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the situation in all large mass communications media. It is impossible, therefore, to distinguish radio and television from newspapers, movie theaters, or magazine and book publishers on this
basis. If barriers to entry and limitations on access to the use of
mass communications media are to be relied on as a basis for imposing regulation of free speech which would not otherwise be
justified, such regulation should not discriminate against radio
and television but should extend to all communications media.
One commentator, recognizing that the natural barriers to
entry into and the limitations on access to the newspaper industry are as great as those which surround broadcasting, has
recently proposed that newspapers should also be subject to
some kind of general editorial regulation, similar to the fairness
doctrine, to ensure that a diversity of viewpoints is presented to
the public. 320 According to this proposal, by Professor Barron,
such regulation would not only be consistent with the first
amendment but it would promote the essential spirit of the first
amendment which, in his view, was not designed to protect the
right to speak freely so much as to protect the right of the public
to hear a diversity of viewpoints. 321 Since barriers to entry and
limitations on access effectively limit the right of the public to
receive such a diversity of views, newspapers and presumably
all other mass media should be required to present all sides of
an issue. Despite a certain superficial appeal, Professor Barron's proposition is unsupportable. His theory fits well with
John Stuart Mill's utilitarian defense of free speech and with
the traditional thinking which conceives of free speech as a surer
way to the truth,322 but it is inadequate as an exposition of the
meaning and thrust of the first amendment and free speech today. One major justification for free speech is, of course, the
320. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967).

321. Id. at 1648-49.

322. Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to

the owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply
a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the
peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it
Is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than
those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of
the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they
lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception
and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with

error.
J.

S.

MILL, ON LIBERTY, in

UmTAuTxmsM, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTA-

= GOVERmiENT 104 (Everyman Lib. 1951). Compare Justice Holmes'
dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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benefit which the public at large derives from hearing a diversity
of viewpoints and ideas. But if the sole or even the paramount
aim of the first amendment is merely to ensure that the public is
able to hear a Babel of voices, the first amendment is not the
great libertarian principle it has been thought to be. Freedom
of speech is a justifiable aim in itself insofar as it helps to create
the individual freedom and security essential to a free society.
It need not be buttressed by any apologies that it will assure the
dissemination of a diversity of viewpoints, that it will ensure a
free marketplace for ideas, or that it is a surer means of advancing truth.
It is suggested that if the government does not place some
direct editorial control on mass communications media, it is in
essence allowing them to be censors, 323 given the effective limits
on entry into such media. According to Barron, this problem
cannot be met by general legislation such as the antitrust laws,
32 4
but must be dealt with by some kind of direct editorial control.
In short, we are told to replace the private censor with a government censor. The portrayal of the mass media as all-powerful
private censors, subject to no one's influence but their own, is
greatly exaggerated. Moreover, the supposed inability of the
antitrust laws or, in the case of broadcasting, the various diversification policies and multiple ownership rules to increase competition is due more to the manner in which they are presently
being applied than to any inherent deficiency in their approach.
Finally, if it is true that the barriers to entry and the limitations on access to the use of mass communications media give
too much control to the mass media, this still does not resolve
the problem. The question of what 'kinds of corrective regulation should be provided and how much government supervision
should be permitted remain. What are we to conclude from the
fact that there are, for example, not sufficient finances to provide
every city of a quarter million population with more than three
local television stations or two local newspapers? Do we infer
from this fact that the government must take upon itself the
responsibility of guiding, if not controlling, the program policies
of these stations or the editorial policies of the newspapers? If
so, does this extend equally to stations in communities which
have ten stations and four newspapers? What kind or degree of
control would be permitted on this basis? At what point is the
line drawn between complete control and mere "influence" of
323. Barton, supra note 320, at 1648.
324. Id. at 1654.
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program choice? What standard shall underlie the Commission's
judgment in acting on such matters? If, for example, audience
surveys show that eighty-five per cent of the population in a
given market prefers light entertainment, should the Commission be guided by this or must it take upon itself the role of a
"leader" in guiding popular choice by setting down more elevated, "enlightened" standards? I would agree with those who
strongly protest the slavish attitudes with which most broadcasters follow the lowest common denominator of public taste,
as represented by audience ratings. I emphatically agree with
the idea, as expressed by one critic, that "the first task of the
purveyors of entertainment and intelligence is to anticipate,
gamble on, whet, stimulate, elevate, and/or broaden the public
taste."3 25 But how can this responsibility be adequately enforced by a government agency without seriously compromising
the first amendment?
Neither society as a whole, Congress, nor the FCC has ever
formulated any principles which satisfactorily guide judgment
on such matters consistent with the aims of an open society.
There have developed, in a long Anglo-American tradition of
legal and social thinking, various controls on the abuse of free
speech, but nowhere in this tradition has there been any developed thinking going beyond sporadic and occasional restraints,
such as prohibition of defamatory speech, obscenity, fraud, and
otherwise patently harmful or socially disrupting speech. There
is no tradition of establishing, for example, standards of "fairness," "diversity," or "balance." These are judgments which,
for better or for worse, have been left to the admittedly sometimes quixotic judgment of the public, unguided by their "enlightened" cultural, social, or political leaders.
There may be little reason to trust the judgment of broadcasters or the managers of other mass communications media,
but is there any more reason to have an abiding faith in the
judgment of the FCC or any other governmental agency? The
probability of the mass media's being responsive to public needs
is, I think, as great, if not greater than the probability that the
FCC's judgment will adequately reflect those needs. And ultimately, the danger to a free society from a reliance on the judgment of private broadcasters is less than from a reliance on the
judgment of the FCC. Barron has expressed a realistic concern
over the tendency of the mass media to avoid the controversial,
325.

L. WHITE, THE AmmcAN RADio 221 (Comm'n on Freedom of

the Press ed. 1947).
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novel, and heretical ideas whose expression is so crucial to a vital
growing society. 26 It is, however, naive in the extreme to suppose that government supervision, through the fairness doctrine
or other means, would ultimately promote heterodoxy. As has
been pointed out above, government intervention in broadcast
programming has in fact been a major impetus toward conformity and orthodoxy.
Where does thb foregoing evaluation, if correct, lead us?
There are undoubtedly some who would conclude that these
considerations must lead ineluctably to the conclusion that
the Congress and the Commission should be allowed to regulate
only the technological aspects of radio and television. This
conclusion, however, seems as extreme in principle as it is naive.
There is no constitutional principle which says that, merely because some forms of regulation of free speech are unconstitutional, all forms of regulation which might affect or in some
manner restrain free speech are similarly unconstitutional. The
first amendment does not forbid the Commission from going
beyond its role as "traffic cop" of the airways. Radio and television are certainly not constitutionally exempt from general
social and economic regulation merely because their business
is the business of communication.
Thus radio and television, like newspapers, are subject to
the general laws which bind all persons, institutions, and businesses, such as the antitrust laws, labor laws, and laws governing
libel, slander, fraud, and other socially disruptive conduct and
speech. Concededly there are first amendment limitations on
the application of such laws, but the limitations are not unique
to 'radio and television. They extend as well to newspapers,
movie theaters, or soap box orators.
Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that because the
Commission may not constitutionally impose its own standards
of orthodox programming or its own standards of balance, fairness, and diversity that it may not in general insist that a licensee investigate and be responsive to demonstrated needs of
his community. The first amendmen.t does not require that a
licensee must be permitted to operate a radio facility purely in
his private and selfish interest with no concern for public needs
and interests. The first amendment comes into play, however,
when the Commission, in the name of reviewing a licensee's responsiveness, begins to concern itself with programming or pro326.

Barron, supranote 320, at 1645-47.
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gram operations to the point of establishing standards of acceptable and nonacceptable programming. It has already reached
and gone beyond this point.
Although some supporters of strong Commission regulation
predict dire consequences in the event the Commission should
relinquish any of its regulatory oversight of licensee program
operations, it is doubtful that the Republic will falter should
the Commission's thus far unfettered powers in this area be
curbed to conform to the first amendment as interpreted for and
applied to other communications media. On the basis of the
first forty years of regulation, it may be difficult to say that the
cause of free speech has suffered egregiously at the hands of the
FCC. But there is every indication that the problem is serious
and becoming increasingly more so. The fairness doctrine which
the Commission seems bent on applying and interpreting with
increasing rigidity, cases such as Palmetto, and an increasing
preoccupation with, if not fetish for, balanced programming are
three very strong reasons for taking a less sanguine view of FCC
regulation in the next forty years and for implementing more
vigorous first amendment limitations on regulation in this field.

